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 ABSTRACT 
This Article endeavors to reclaim the nationwide injunction as a valid exercise of 
federal equity power within the jurisdictional limits set by Article III. It posits that 
federal equity is expansive—it extends as far as necessary to provide a remedy where 
there is no adequate one at law. Historical and doctrinal context and critique are 
deployed to demonstrate that nationwide injunctions are not constitutionally ultra 
vires. This Article also posits that despite having expansive equity jurisdiction and 
powers, federal courts can and should in many cases exercise their constitutional 
discretion when sitting in equity to abstain in certain nationwide injunction suits. It 
goes on to propose a prudential, discretionary kind of abstention with factors 
calibrated to deter abusive litigation tactics, prevent untoward interference with non-
party rights and forum-shopping, promote comity between district courts, and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nationwide injunctions are broad, enjoining defendants from engaging in 
particular acts both in and outside of the geographic territory of the issuing court and 
often govern the defendants’ conduct as to both parties and nonparties.1 The remedy 
has been part of federal practice for at least a century, and for much of its history has 
been both rarely awarded and normatively unproblematic.2  
Public narratives about nationwide injunctions shifted dramatically at the tail end 
of the Obama administration and public outcry reached a fever pitch under the Trump 
administration. With increasing frequency, federal district courts issued nationwide 
injunctions enjoining federal programs, rules, and policies in cases touching on the 
most heated political issues of the day—immigration,3 contraception,4 transgender 
rights,5 and labor,6 to name a few. This spurred outcries that lone wolf activist federal 
judges are running roughshod over the rule of law.7  
 
1 Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (2018) 
(defining the remedy); see also Portia Pedro, Toward Establishing a Pre-Extinction Definition 
of “Nationwide Injunctions,” 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 847, 867–68 (2020) (taking a critical view 
of alternative definitions of the remedy percolating in scholarly literature). 
2 See discussion infra Section II.A.  
3 See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming 
nationwide injunction against regulation establishing additional limits and conditions rendering 
certain aliens ineligible for asylum); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming nationwide injunction against government’s 
rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program based in part on 
“the need for uniformity in immigration policy”), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 140 S. Ct. 
1891 (2020); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming nationwide 
preliminary injunction against government’s expansion of DACA), aff’d by equally divided 
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (Mem.). 
4 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 798 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff’d sub nom. 
Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Trump v. 
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (Mem.); see also California v. Health & Human Servs., 
351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d sub nom. California v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 941 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated sub nom., Little Sisters of the Poor 
Jeane Jugan Residence v. California, 141 S. Ct. 192 (2020) (Mem.). 
5 Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (O’Connor, J.) (enjoining 
federal enforcement of Title VII and Title IX’s sex discrimination proscriptions as to 
transgender workers and students); Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 670 
(N.D. Tex. 2016) (O’Connor, J.) (enjoining provision of Obama-era Department of Health and 
Human Services regulation defining sex discrimination to reach “gender identity”). 
6 See, e.g., Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 321 F. Supp. 3d 709, 713 (E.D. Tex. 2018) (holding 
nonparty employee and counsel in contempt after they brought separate action to recover 
overtime wages based on earlier issued nationwide injunction against the same regulation), 
rev’d sub nom. Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 929 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2019). 
7 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Samuel Bray, Judges Shouldn’t Have the Power to Halt Laws 
Nationwide, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-nationwide-injunctions/574471/ 
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Recently, critics of the nationwide injunction have argued that the remedy is 
unconstitutional. Their argument comes in two parts. First, they insist nationwide 
injunctions are inherently problematic because, among other things, they incentivize 
forum- and judge-shopping, can give rise to conflicting injunctions and orders, 
impinge nonparty rights, depress percolation of issues in lower courts, and weaken the 
certiorari process. Second, they urge that these problems arise because nationwide 
injunctions violate any of three supposed limits on Article III’s equity—the remedy is 
beyond the powers of the English Chancellor at the time the Constitution was ratified 
in 1789, broader than traditionally permitted because it affects the rights of non-
parties, or is otherwise antithetical to federal equity tradition.8 The common thread of 
these attacks is that the nationwide injunction’s supposed novelty gives rise to 
problems that are otherwise inexplicable and necessarily renders the remedy 
illegitimate. 
The historical argument is perhaps most infamously espoused by Samuel Bray in 
his article Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction.9 Pointing to 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. 
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,10 Bray argues that the metes and bounds of the equity 
powers vested in Article III judges are limited to those traditionally exercised by the 
 
[https://perma.cc/2TMP-XR23] (“National injunctions are equal-opportunity offenders. . . . 
[T]he United States is a fractious, complicated democracy, and it’s disconcerting how much 
authority we’ve ceded to lone, unelected judges.”); Joseph Digenova, Governance by Court 
injunction is No Way to Run a Country, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-digenova-federal-injunctions-20181204-
story.html (“The spate of judicial bullying has laid bare a major structural problem with our 
federal courts: When nationwide injunctions are too easily obtained, the country is essentially 
ruled by a judicial dictatorship. . . . This isn’t about politics; it’s about returning the courts to 
their proper constitutional role. The executive branch cannot function if activist lawyers—
without winning a single election—can set policy for months or years just by shopping around 
for a federal judge sympathetic to their cause.”); Associated Press, Federal Judge Orders Halt 
to ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Enforcement, FOX NEWS (Oct. 12, 2010), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/federal-judge-orders-halt-to-dont-ask-dont-tell-
enforcement [https://perma.cc/X2X7-JKBL] (“For a single federal judge to tell the government 
to stop enforcing this policy worldwide, this afternoon, with no time to think about it or plan for 
it, is almost unprecedented.” (quoting Richard Socarides, former Clinton White House adviser 
on gay rights)). 
8 Michael Dorf has characterized this “antiquarian objection” as “ridiculous.” Michael C. Dorf, 
Promo for My Travel Ban Column—And a Thought About Justice Thomas’s Potshot at 
Nationwide Injunctions, DORF ON L. (June 27, 2018), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/06/promo-for-my-travel-ban-column-and.html 
[https://perma.cc/R9CF-B3VP]. 
9 See generally Samuel Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017). 
10 See generally Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 
(1999). 
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English Chancellor at the turn of the eighteenth century.11 That is, on a purportedly 
originalist account, Bray construes Article III to vest federal courts with equity powers 
concomitant with those of the English Chancellor at the time of ratification of the 
Constitution. At that point in time, Bray contends, because the English Chancellor was 
unitary—there was only one chancellor, not multiple—the Chancellor had no need 
and thus no power to issue anything like the overlapping and sometimes conflicting 
nationwide injunctions we see today.12 Then, focusing narrowly on American federal 
equity practice, Bray claims that because nationwide injunctions did not issue before 
the 1960s, their recent lineage evidences they are a perversion of traditional equity 
powers.13 
Other commentators simply conclude that the problems concomitant to the power 
to issue nationwide injunctions—forum shopping, competing injunctions, stifling the 
percolation of issues before they reach the Supreme Court, to name a few—weigh 
against legitimating them as proper exercises of remedial equity power.14 Some split 
the baby and simply suggest that we tame the nationwide injunction by prescribing 
formal limits on issuance, implying that if federal trial judges had more rigid guides 
fewer purportedly problematic injunctions would issue.15 
There are some defenders of the nationwide injunction. Most in this camp insist 
that the broad reach of nationwide injunctions is a necessary remedy in exceptional 
cases. For instance, Amanda Frost and Suzette Malveaux separately argue that certain 
issues are of such national import that cross-jurisdictional relief is necessary.16 Most 
defenders of the remedy focus narrowly on why it is needed, rather than whether it is 
within the jurisdiction and powers of our federal chancellors.17 For example, civil 
 
11 Bray, supra note 9, at 425 (“The equitable doctrines and remedies of the federal courts must 
find some warrant in the traditional practice of equity, especially as it existed in the Court of 
Chancery in 1789.”). 
12 Id. at 446–48. 
13 Id. at 467–69. 
14 See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” 
Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 363–65 (2018). 
15 Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2139–47 (2017) 
(suggesting an amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 that would codify the “complete relief 
principle”); Matthew Erickson, Note, Who, What, Where: A Case for a Multifactor Balancing 
Test As a Solution to Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 359–60 (2018) 
(arguing that courts should adopt a three-factor test that takes into account “who” benefits from 
injunction sought and if there are a large number of nonparty beneficiaries a nationwide 
injunction is improper). 
16 Frost, supra note 1, at 1090–94; Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the 
National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 64 (2018). 
17 One notable exception is Mila Sohoni. In her Harvard Law Review article, Sohoni argues 
that the remedy has been unfairly categorized as novel. Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the 
“Universal Injunction,” 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924 (2020). Even if “traditional” practice 
limits federal equity, Sohoni points out that the Supreme Court and lower courts have issued 
injunctions that reach beyond the plaintiff, including injunctions against the enforcement of 
federal law, for more than a century. While Sohoni’s work has uncovered a useful historical 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
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rights lawyers, like Spencer Amdur and David Hausman, point out that the serious 
injuries that typically give rise to suits seeking nationwide injunctions can only be 
prevented if sweeping relief is afforded.18  
The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to speak to the propriety of nationwide 
injunctions on several occasions.19 But a recent exchange between Justices Gorsuch 
and Sotomayor in early 2020 suggests the Court is poised to soon decide whether 
nationwide injunctions are constitutional.  
 
record that refutes the empirical novelty critique of nationwide injunctions, it does not explain 
why the novelty critique strikes a chord with critiques of the remedy let alone how it operates 
in the current political climate. This Article endeavors to build off of Sohoni’s work and tackle 
those exact questions. 
18 Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 
HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 51–53 (2017). 
19 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2393, 2423 (2018) (reversing on the merits a lower 
court decision finding the Trump Administration’s so-called “Muslim Ban” illicit and, as a 
consequence, vacating the nationwide injunction issued below); Trump v. Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per curiam) (declining federal government’s 
request to stay preliminary nationwide injunctions extending to “respondents and those 
similarly situated”); Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (Mem.) (affirming 
nationwide injunction blocking the Obama-era Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
(DAPA) program with an equally divided Court); Monsanto Co. v. Geertoson Seed Farms, 561 
U.S. 139, 166 (2010) (Alito, J.) (holding that lower court’s nationwide injunction enjoining the 
Department of Agriculture’s decision to deregulate the Roundup Ready Alfalfa plant should be 
vacated because the district court abused its discretion in enjoining the agency’s partial 
deregulation, not because the remedy itself was categorically infirm); Summers v. Earth Inst., 
555 U.S. 488, 500–01 (2009) (Scalia, J.); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 
16 (2006) (Breyer, J.) (holding in context of alleged national conspiracy to shut down abortion 
clinics nationwide that threatening or committing physical violence unrelated to robbery or 
extortion which obstructs, delays, or affects commerce falls outside the scope of the Hobbs Act; 
reversing on liability and, as a result, overturning nationwide injunction restricting protest 
activities of defendants and those acting in concert with them); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for 
Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 411 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding that interference with 
operation of abortion clinics was not extortion, as would be necessary to support a RICO 
violation, reversing on merits and vacating nationwide injunction restricting protest activities 
of defendants and those acting in concert with them); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation 
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (explaining that nationwide preliminary 
injunction of federal law imposing limit on attorneys’ fees in Department of Veterans Affairs 
proceedings warranted expedited review by the Court given the remedy’s breadth), Walters, 
473 U.S. at 336 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining expedited review “is appropriate in the 
rare case such as this where a district court has issued a nationwide injunction that in practical 
effect invalidates a federal law”); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., 468 U.S. 
841, 859 (1984) (Burger, J.) (holding statute denying federal financial aid to male students who 
fail to register for draft constitutional, reversing on the merits and vacating nationwide 
injunction of federal statute); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 123, 132 (1940) 
(reversing lower courts’ nationwide injunction on finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but 
stopping short of deeming the scope of the remedy per se problematic). See generally Lujan v. 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (holding that national wildlife group’s 
challenge of “land withdrawal review program” by the Bureau of Land Management unviable 
for a variety of reasons, despite trial and intermediate appellate court concluding claims were 
sufficiently substantial to warrant entry of a nationwide injunction). 
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The exchange arose amidst a series of extraordinary stays requested by the Trump 
administration. At issue was the administration’s new public charge rule, a test that 
seeks to determine whether an immigrant applying to enter the United States, extend 
their visa, or convert their temporary immigration status into a green card is likely to 
end up relying on public benefits in the future.20 The rule had been enjoined on a 
nationwide basis by several district courts21 and limitedly in the state of Illinois only 
by another district court.22 Initially,  the Court granted the Trump administration 
emergency stays over all the public-charge rule nationwide injunctions in Department 
of Homeland Security v. New York, leaving in place the injunction covering only 
Illinois.23 Concurring with that order, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, 
claimed the nationwide injunction is a fundamentally new remedy, framed problems 
like forum-shopping and conflicting orders as being precipitated by the fact that the 
remedy is a new one, and urged that the chaos sown by nationwide injunctions might 
soon make it necessary for the Court to “take up some of the underlying equitable and 
constitutional questions raised by the rise of nationwide injunctions.”24 But just a 
month later, the Court stayed the Illinois-only injunction in Wolf v. Cook County. 
Dissenting from that order, Justice Sotomayor urged that the Court had been duped—
nationwide injunctions were not the real problem.25 Incisively, she explained how the 
Trump administration had, with the Court’s help, repeatedly sought and won 
 
20 The public charge rule is controversial. For the last 20 years, the federal government has 
defined as a “public charge” as a person “primarily dependent on the government for 
subsistence.” Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 
64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,689 (May 26, 1999). Under that same guidance, immigration officers 
were not to consider non-cash public benefits in deciding whether noncitizens met that 
definition. The new rule redefined “public charge” as an alien who receives one or more 
designated public benefits for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period 
(such that, for instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months). 
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,295 (Aug. 14, 2019), 
reversed by Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds: Implementation of Vacatur, 86 Fed. 
Reg. 14,221 (Mar. 15, 2021). This redefinition would have dramatically expanded the type of 
benefits that render a noncitizen inadmissible, including non-cash benefits such as Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program, most forms of Medicaid, and various forms of housing 
assistance. Id. 
21 Make the Road N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, 419 F. Supp. 3d 647, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting 
nationwide preliminary injunction); Make the Road N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19 Civ. 7993, 2019 
WL 6498283, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2019) (denying stay pending appeal); New York v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting nationwide 
preliminary injunction); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19 Civ. 7777, 2019 
WL 6498250, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2019) (denying stay pending appeal); aff’d, No. 19-3595, 
2020 WL 95815, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2020). 
22 Cook Cnty. v. McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (granting preliminary 
injunction of public charge rule solely within the boundaries of the State of Illinois). 
23 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599 (2020). 
24 Id. at 601. 
25 Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 682 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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extraordinary stays in ways that caused the very abuses of process Gorsuch had 
claimed nationwide injunctions sow.26   
Initially, conservatives rushed to support Gorsuch’s attack on nationwide 
injunctions with some liberals joining.27 But critiques were limited from the left before 
Sotomayor’s dissent.28 Once Sotomayor issued her dissent in Wolf, things escalated. 
Pundits on the right questioned the sincerity of Sotomayor’s arguments and accused 
her of being partisan.29 Predictably, President Trump joined the fray on Twitter, 
calling for Sotomayor’s recusal on the premise that her dissent in Wolf was tantamount 
to accusing the conservative justices of being “biased in favor of Trump,” which he 
claimed reflected her own anti-Trump proclivities.30 While pundits on the left rushed 
 
26 Id. at 683–84; see also District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 53 
(D.D.C. 2020) (characterizing similarly that the chaos Gorsuch described “was a product not of 
a nationwide injunction, which would quickly settle legal issues at play once and for all potential 
plaintiffs, but of emergency appeals by the federal government seeking stays of nationwide 
injunctions entered by district courts”).   
27 See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, Democrats Need to Listen to Neil Gorsuch’s Surprisingly Good Idea, 
VOX (Jan. 29, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/1/29/21094603/supreme-court-
decision-on-immigration-neil-gorsuch-democrats [https://perma.cc/MV6K-FJPW] (framing 
Gorsuch’s call to end nationwide injunctions as bipartisan). 
28 But see Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court in the Mean Season, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/opinion/supreme-court-immigration-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/7VDA-8SQJ] (pointing out hypocrisy of conservative justices 
decrying “the rise of nationwide injunctions”—“I don’t remember such hand-wringing a few 
years back when anti-immigrant states found a friendly judge in South Texas to issue a 
nationwide injunction against President Barack Obama’s expansion of the DACA program to 
include parents of the ‘Dreamers’. The Supreme Court let that injunction stand.”). 
29 See, e.g., Carrie Campbell Severino, Ginsburg and Sotomayor Are the Most Political Jurists, 
NAT’L REV. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/ginsburg-and-
sotomayor-are-the-most-political-justices/ [https://perma.cc/BQ9D-86XU] (decrying 
Sotomayor’s Wolf dissent as creating “a national spectacle” and claiming Sotomayor’s critique 
evidences she and those like her are “ideologues willing to put their thumbs on the scale for 
liberal causes”). 
30 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 24, 2020, 11:09 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1232155591537254400?s=20 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200225195212/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/12
32155591537254400?s=20] (quoting conservative commentator Laura Ingraham’s claim that 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Wolf is tantamount to “accus[ing] appointed Justices of being 
biased in favor of Trump” and reflecting that “[t]his is a terrible thing to say. Trying to ‘shame’ 
some into voting her way? She never criticized Justice Ginsburg when she called me a ‘faker’. 
Both should recuse themselves.”); Bobby Lewis, Fox & Friends Rewrites History to Defend 
Trump’s Attack on the Supreme Court, MEDIA MATTERS (Mar. 5, 2020, 11:02 AM), 
https://www.mediamatters.org/supreme-court/fox-friends-rewrites-history-defend-trumps-
attack-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/6WSV-ME7J] (arguing that hosts of “Fox and Friends” 
“falsely suggested that an earlier attack from President Donald Trump on Justices Sonia 
Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg was justified” in part based on accusation that 
Sotomayor’s dissent in Wolf amounted to “political, biased remarks about [Trump]”); see also 
Robert Barnes & Ashley Parker, Trump Dials up His Unusual Battle with the Judiciary, WASH. 
POST (Feb 25, 2020, 7:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/trump-
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to label the conservative response as yet another product of Trumpism, few deigned 
to substantively speak to the propriety of nationwide injunctions.31 While some did try 
to make sense of these attacks,32 few appreciated the stakes for the Court, our modern 
day chancellors, and federal equity.  
This Article endeavors to reclaim the nationwide injunction as a valid exercise of 
federal equity. I posit that federal equity is quite expansive—in exceptional cases, it 
extends as far as necessary to provide a remedy where there is no adequate one at law. 
These clear, simple limits were set by Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789 and are 
evidenced by writings of the Framers and have been readily recognized by the 
Supreme Court, albeit with some equivocation, from the earliest days of the Republic 
to present.  
Even though federal equity jurisdiction is quite expansive, there are important 
limits on its exercise. Courts sitting in equity are empowered to abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction granted to them and, I contend, in some cases when faced with 
a request for a nationwide injunction abstention is absolutely necessary. In fact, I 
venture that many of the most pressing problems raised by nationwide injunctions can 
be remedied if a new kind of abstention is recognized by the Supreme Court.  
My proposal envisions a prudential, discretionary kind of abstention, akin to 
Colorado River33 abstention, that can be invoked by a federal trial judge when a party 
moves for a nationwide injunction. The factors are calibrated to deter abusive litigation 
 
dials-up-his-unusual-battle-with-the-judiciary/2020/02/25/fd930eb4-5803-11ea-9000-
f3cffee23036_story.html [https://perma.cc/KUB3-KTHB] (reporting on Trump’s tweet calling 
for Sotomayor to recuse herself in cases involving the Administration); Adam Liptak, In Case 
on Wealth Test for Green Cards, a Scathing Sotomayor Dissent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/us/wealth-test-supreme-court-sotomayor.html 
[https://perma.cc/EB6D-JQ6V] (describing Sotomayor’s dissent as “scathing” rebuke of Trump 
Administration). 
31 See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Trump Is at War With the Whole Idea of an Independent Judiciary, 
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/trump-
independent-judiciary/607375/ [https://perma.cc/3Q4B-TXXZ] (contextualizing Trump’s 
attack on Sotomayor as illustrative of an overarching “theme,” explaining that “[w]hen Trump 
or his friends are concerned with a case, the president wants to choose, or intimidate, both judge 
and jury; participants in the nominally independent judicial process must now fear not only his 
criticism but threats or even violence from his supporters”); Aaron Rupar, Trump’s Demand for 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor to Recuse Themselves, Briefly Explained, VOX (Feb. 25, 2020, 11:45 
AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/25/21152567/trump-sotomayor-ginsburg-supreme-court-
indian-news-conference [https://perma.cc/8CSH-2BQQ] (“Trump’s attacks on Supreme Court 
justices he perceives as being insufficiently loyal to him point to how, following his 
impeachment acquittal, he’s feeling increasingly emboldened to attack any and all checks on 
his power. They also illustrate his conviction that anybody who has said a critical word about 
him, even indirectly, is disqualified from involvement in cases pertaining to his interests.”). 
32 Daily News Editorial Board, Supreme Hypocrisy: Trump’s Selective Umbrage High Court 
Justices, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-edit-
scotus-20200226-ed6m7hzc2bgdjif4n74kviq7za-story.html [https://perma.cc/6EC3-V3R9] 
(arguing Trump’s comments are hypocritical in light of his valorization of the late Justice 
Antonin Scalia who openly attacked the Obama Administration’s DACA policy in public fora 
but declined to recuse himself from immigration cases). 
33 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814–17 (1976). 
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tactics, prevent untoward interference with non-party rights and forum-shopping, and 
should promote horizontal comity between the district courts as well as percolation of 
issues. District Courts would, under this proposal, be empowered to dispose of these 
suits in some instances and in others simply to decline to consider the relief sought.  
This Article has three parts. Part II presents the terrain of the nationwide injunction 
debate. It recounts the lost history of nationwide injunctions which reveals they are 
not a new remedy, unpacks how and why the Trump administration embraced and 
made the novelty critique a driving feature of its litigation strategy and public 
messaging against the remedy, and concludes by arguing that the problems we 
encounter with nationwide injunctions are not necessarily unique to the remedy let 
alone caused by its supposed novelty.    
Part III explores the metes and bounds of Article III’s equity. It posits that federal 
equity is quite expansive, extending as far as necessary to give justice to the parties. 
Though, in some respects, federal equity is informed by tradition, a long line of 
Supreme Court decisions reflects that Article III’s equity is dynamic and, most 
certainly, its metes and bounds are not delimited by those of the historic English 
Chancellor. It ultimately concludes that nationwide injunctions are constitutional. 
Part IV presents the nationwide injunction abstention proposal. It suggests that one 
means of inoculating against abuses of nationwide injunctions is for courts to embrace 
their abstention power. When sitting in equity, federal courts are well within their 
Article III powers to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over certain nationwide 
injunction cases. This Part goes on to suggest factors and balancing considerations. It 
closes by exploring the benefits of an abstention approach to nationwide injunction 
suits and explores likely objections to the proposal.  
One contribution of this Article is its contextualization of the Trump 
administration’s crusade against nationwide injunctions as being part of its larger 
campaign to deflate the judiciary’s capacity to meaningfully check the executive. 
While some commentators are concerned that more nationwide injunctions are being 
issued today than in the past,34 this is not in and of itself evidence of judicial 
overreach.35 Rather, it might simply reflect that the judiciary is actively checking 
executive overreach,36 just as the Framers intended. Reframed thusly, we can see that 
claims that federal courts lack the authority to enjoin executive overreach even where 
proven as a “call for the federal courts to abdicate [the] judicial check on the executive 
 
34 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
35 But see Tessa Berenson, Inside the Trump Administration’s Fight to End Nationwide 
Injunctions, TIME (Nov. 4, 2019, 3:12 PM), https://time.com/5717541/nationwide-injunctions-
trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/BQ6P-ZCUU] (characterizing the frequency critique as 
confusing “cause and effect”). 
36 Judge Rovner of the Seventh Circuit suggested as much in his panel opinion in City of 
Chicago v. Barr, there dryly observing that while many scholars were concerned by “the 
perceived increase in the utilization of universal injunctions in the past few decades,” that 
perhaps “another forum” could assess “whether any such increase signals an expanding judicial 
overreach or an increasing executive autocracy.” City of Chicago v. Barr, 957 F.3d 772, 803 
(7th Cir. 2020). 
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branch.”37 This Article goes on to argue that while power grabs are not totally 
unexpected, the prospect of the judiciary acquiescing to the executive’s calls to 
abdicate its check endangers the maintenance of our constitutional order. 
Additionally, this Article also makes an important contribution to literature 
speaking to the constitutional limits of federal equity. Federal equity jurisdiction and 
powers are set by Article III.38 However, the exact limits are not well understood. 
Supreme Court cases explaining the metes and bounds of federal equity are all over 
the map. Some appear to say that federal equity is concomitant with that of the English 
Chancellor at the birth of the Republic. Others seem to disavow that limit. This Article 
reconciles these decisions by explaining that federal courts invoke the English 
Chancellor not because he sets historic limits on our equity but rather because he 
symbolically manifests equity’s aspirational aims. This ahistoric chancellor embodies 
equity’s overarching commitments to justice and fairness. He also represents a 
promise by our modern-day chancellors that their conscience is guided by a measure 
of stability and capacity for change that are characteristic of equity’s long tradition.  
Another key contribution of this Article is its suggestion that federal courts use 
their inherent power to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over equitable matters as 
a means to inoculate against potential abuses sowed by nationwide injunctions.39 
There are several benefits to deploying abstention to the nationwide injunction 
problem. One key advantage of this approach, as opposed to other proposed 
solutions,40 is that abstention helps shore up the institutional legitimacy problems 
imprudently granted nationwide injunctions lay bare. 
II. THE TERRAIN 
This Part sketches out the nationwide injunction debate. It begins by elevating the 
lost history of nationwide injunctions in courts and public discourse, revealing that the 
remedy is not novel. From there, it unpacks how and why the Trump administration 
has embraced the novelty critique and made it a driving feature of its litigation strategy 
and public messaging against the remedy. It concludes by arguing that the problems 
we encounter with nationwide injunctions are not necessarily unique to the remedy let 





37 Benjamin Spencer, First, We’ll Neuter the All the Judges, THE HILL (Feb. 14, 2020, 2:00 
PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/482788-first-well-neuter-all-the-judges 
[https://perma.cc/U9BU-QJNJ].   
38 Article III vests the Supreme Court with the full judicial power in cases arising under both 
law and equity. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . . .”). It also 
confers Congress with the sole power to create inferior courts and set their jurisdiction by 
statute. See id. § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
39 See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
40 See infra Section IV.E (discussing why other proposed solutions are a poor fit). 
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A. Nationwide Injunctions Are Not Novel 
In recent years, a pernicious myth about nationwide injunctions has taken on a life 
of itself—that the remedy is novel, and that its novelty evidences its impropriety if not 
its outright unconstitutionality.  
The Trump administration not only embraced the novelty critique but made it a 
driving feature of its litigation strategy and public messaging against nationwide 
injunctions. For instance, Department of Justice guidance issued in 2018 directed 
attorneys to oppose nationwide injunctions in virtually every case justifies the move 
on the theory that there are no known examples of nationwide injunctions issued in 
the United States prior to 1963.41 The remedy’s novelty, the guidance claims, 
evidences that nationwide injunctions are an “extreme remedy.”42 It goes on to suggest 
that federal judges of the past must not have issued nationwide injunctions because 
they understood the remedy to be beyond the judicial power.43 The novelty critique 
also featured prominently in then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s remarks publicly 
announcing the guidance’s issuance:  
 
In the first 175 years of this Republic, not a single judge issued one of those orders. 
It’s not as though there weren’t legal controversies before 1963. There were many. 
But nobody issued a nationwide injunction[.] We’re going to fight them all the 
way to the Supreme Court. I am confident that the law is on our side. History is on 
our side.44  
 
Sessions hammered the nationwide injunction’s novelty again in remarks to the 
Heritage Foundation a month later, then insisting that “[s]cholars have not found a 
single example of any judge issuing this type of extreme remedy before the 1960s.”45 
In the months that followed, the Trump administration and its supporters’ messaging 
sharpened, increasingly insisting that nationwide injunctions are a recent invention 
and that the remedy’s novelty evidences its unconstitutionality.46 
 
41 Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Heads of Civil Litigating Components, 
U.S. Att’ys 3 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1093881/download [https://perma.cc/J9VQ-FZH8]. 
42 Id. at 4.   
43 Id. at 3 (“They were unknown in the English courts of equity and so were not part of the 
jurisdictional grant made by the Judiciary Act.”). 
44 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen. Sessions Delivers Remarks Announcing New 
Memo on Nationwide Injunctions (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-
new-memo-nationwide-injunctions [https://perma.cc/ZNP3-WKXY]. 
45 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen. Sessions Delivers Remarks at the Heritage 
Foundation’s Legal Strategy Forum (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-heritage-
foundation-s-legal-strategy-forum [https://perma.cc/7PAA-H32W]. 
46 See discussion and notes infra Section II.B. 
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The novelty critique is increasingly popular with some ideologically conservative 
federal judges. For instance, in his concurrence to Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Thomas 
characterizes nationwide injunctions as being “legally and historically dubious.”47 To 
Thomas’s eye, nationwide injunctions break with the historic practice and 
understanding of federal judges that the “judicial power” is “fundamentally the power 
to render judgments in individual cases.”48 The novelty critique is also featured in 
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Department of Homeland Security v. New York. 
There, Gorsuch lambasts the remedy as having “little basis in traditional equitable 
practice,” “an innovation we should [not] rush to embrace,” a stranger to the 
“traditional system,” and a “a sign of our impatient times.”49 The cure, Gorsuch urges, 
is a return to the past—“good judicial decisions are usually tempered by older 
virtues.”50 
But nationwide injunctions are not exactly novel.  
There are plenty of precursors to the nationwide injunction. Equity courts have 
historically granted broad injunctions protecting the rights of non-parties. Bills of 
peace were used to resolve claims where many individuals shared a common interest.51 
Ordinary bills for injunctions also frequently protected individuals with a common 
interest.52 Equity courts have also historically granted broad injunctions to protect the 
rights of groups of individuals.53 Legal historians point out that some of these 
injunctions protected upwards of hundreds of thousands of nonparties.54  
The nationwide injunction as we know it today is not even particularly new. While 
it is difficult to precisely identify when the nationwide injunction came on the scene,55 
it has been part of federal equity practice for more than a century. Mila Sohoni’s Lost 
History of the “Universal” Injunction points to nationwide injunctions issued by the 
Supreme Court in the 1910s and 1920s56 as well as a slew of other sweeping 
 
47 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2429 (2018). 
48 Id. at 2427. 
49 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Mem.). 
50 Id. 
51 Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and Appellee the City of 
Chicago at 8–12, City of Chicago v. Whitaker, sub nom. City of Chicago v. Barr, 957 F.3d 772 
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-2885), 2018 WL 6173238, at *8–12. 
52 Id. at 12–15.    
53 Id. at 15–18.     
54 Id. at 15.    
55 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 943–44 (explaining evidence points to the Supreme Court issuing 
nationwide type injunctions as early as 1913, but that it is possible if not probable that the 
remedy had been used by the Court or lower courts earlier than that).  
56 For instance, in the run-up to its decision in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 228 
(1913), the Supreme Court issued an order in 1916 that, pending its disposition of the case, 
barred a federal law from being applied not just to the plaintiffs, but to anyone. See Sohoni, 
supra note 17, at 944–46 (providing background and discussing significance of the order). The 
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injunctions issued by lower courts that directly and intentionally benefitted 
nonparties.57  
One consequence of mistakenly thinking of nationwide injunctions as new is that 
we miss the rich history of how federal courts have squared the remedy with their 
judicial power, made sense of the remedy’s breadth, and how the public has responded. 
Until recently, nationwide injunctions do not seem to have raised difficult 
questions about the metes and bounds judicial power. For a long time, federal courts 
simply assumed nationwide injunctions to be within the metes and bounds of federal 
equity. For instance, high-profile Supreme Court cases on lightning rod issues of the 
day, like a challenge to compulsory male selective service registration,58 dryly 
reference the fact that a nationwide injunction was issued and go on to address the 
merits of the underlying decision. When pressed to justify the remedy, federal courts 
reasoned that they have inherent judicial authority to issue nationwide injunctions 
even in the absence of a specific authorizing statute.59 An early representative example 
is the 1939 nationwide injunction issued in Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins.60 There, the 
D.C. Circuit reasoned that federal courts have the power to enjoin a federal official 
and agency from engaging in certain purchasing activities with respect to iron and 
steel industries and ultimately deemed it of no moment that there was no legislation 
expressly authorizing such an injunction.61  
 
Court issued a similar order enjoining enforcement of a federal law beyond the plaintiffs in 
1921, pending its final disposition in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922), a challenge to the 
Future Trading Act. See Sohoni, supra note 17, at 946–52 (providing background and discussing 
significance of the order). 
Additionally, in 1935 the Supreme Court issued a discretionary stay order in Landis v. North 
American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936), halting all but one suit challenging the constitutionality of 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Id. at 250–51. The Landis discretionary stay 
operated as a kind of self-imposed nationwide injunction, approved in exchange for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, which feared a multiplicity of suits, promising to stay 
enforcement of the challenged federal law as to anyone during the pendency of the suit.  
57 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 959–73.  
58 Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 846 (1984) (Burger, C.J.) 
(noting district court’s issuance of nationwide injunction). 
59 See Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 789 & 
n.188 (2008) (“Federal courts generally relief upon the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994), 
for the authority to enter injunctions not otherwise expressly authorized by statute.”); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651(a) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all 
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages 
and principles of law.”). 
60 Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F.2d 627, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1939).  
61 Id. at 638. Although the Supreme Court later reversed the D.C. Circuit, the reversal hinged 
on its finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, it did not deem the scope of the injunction per 
se problematic. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (“[N]o legal rights of 
respondents were shown to have been invaded or threatened in the complaint upon which the 
injunction of the Court of Appeals was based.”); see also Sohoni, supra note 17, at 926 
(characterizing Perkins as leaving “intact the propriety of injunctions reaching beyond plaintiffs 
with standing”). But see Samuel Bray, A Response to The Lost History of the “Universal” 
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 The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to reject the nationwide 
injunction and declined to do so. As recently as 2017, the Court declined the federal 
government’s request in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project62 to stay 
preliminary injunctions extending to “respondents and those similarly situated.”63 The 
Fourth Circuit has since construed this as “affirm[ing] the equitable power of district 
courts, in appropriate cases, to issue nationwide injunctions.”64  
Where the Supreme Court has disturbed nationwide injunctions, it has identified 
infirmities in the suits that obviate the remedy. For example, the Court reversed the 
nationwide injunction issued in Lukens, but its decision hinged on finding the plaintiffs 
lacked standing rather than finding the remedy is categorically infirm.65 Similarly, in 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,66 a challenge to a nationwide injunction 
enjoining the Department of Agriculture’s decision to deregulate the Roundup Ready 
Alfalfa plant, the Court explains that the remedy should be vacated because the district 
court abused its discretion in enjoining the agency’s partial deregulation, not because 
the remedy was categorically infirm.67 And in Summers v. Earth Island Institute,68 a 
challenge to a nationwide injunction enjoining the Forest Service’s approval of 
salvage sales of timber on fire damaged federal lands, the Court reasoned that the 
remedy should be vacated because the plaintiffs failed to establish standing, mooting 
the question as to whether in that specific case “a nationwide injunction would be 
appropriate.”69   
This is not to say that the courts have not been weary of breadth generally and the 
nationwide injunction’s breadth specifically.  
The Supreme Court has urged that remedies be no broader than necessary. 
However, the Court has not ever taught that a remedy’s breadth renders it categorically 
 
Injunction, YALE J. REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 6, 2019), 
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/a-response-to-the-lost-history-of-the-universal-injunction-by-
samuel-bray/ [https://perma.cc/4GED-PJDK] (arguing otherwise). 
62 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088–89 (2017) (per curiam).  
63 Id. at 2087. 
64 Roe v. Dep’t of Def., 947 F.3d 207, 232 (4th Cir. 2020); see also City of Chicago v. Sessions, 
888 F.3d 272, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part, 
No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2017) (construing Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, as signaling validity of nationwide injunctions). 
65 Perkins, 310 U.S. at 125 (“[N]o legal rights of respondents were shown to have been invaded 
or threatened in the complaint upon which the injunction of the Court of Appeals was based.”); 
see also Sohoni, supra note 17, at 926 (characterizing Perkins as leaving “intact the propriety 
of injunctions reaching beyond plaintiffs with standing”). But see Bray, supra note 61 (arguing 
otherwise).  
66 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 144 (2010) (Alito, J.). 
67 Id. at 165 (“[T]he impropriety of the District Court’s broad injunction against planting flows 
from the impropriety of its injunction against partial deregulation.”). 
68 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 490 (2009) (Scalia, J.).  
69 Id. at 500–01. 
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infirm. For instance, in Califano v. Yamasaki, the Court teaches that when crafting 
remedies courts must take heed of equity’s “rule that injunctive relief should be no 
more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the 
plaintiffs.”70 It goes on to explain, that in the context of a nationwide class action, the 
size of the class of plaintiffs does not make a remedy impossible.71  
As to nationwide injunctions specifically, the Supreme Court has long suggested 
that the remedy’s breadth may warrant special consideration on review. For instance, 
in Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,72 Justice Rehnquist, writing for 
the majority, explains that a nationwide preliminary injunction enjoining a federal law 
that imposed a limit on attorneys’ fees in Department of Veterans Affairs proceedings 
warranted immediate review by the Supreme Court under a since repealed procedural 
mechanism because such a broad injunction, if left in place, frustrates the will of 
Congress.73 Rehnquist’s point does not seem to be that nationwide injunctions are 
ultra vires, but rather, that their breadth can sometimes justify expedited review given 
how much more disruptive they are than more narrow injunctions. Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Walters echoes that sentiment, explaining that expedited review “is 
appropriate in the rare case such as this where a district court has issued a nationwide 
injunction that in practical effect invalidates a federal law.”74 Similarly, in Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Federation,75 Justice Blackman, writing “in dissent but apparently 
expressing the view of all nine justices,”76 suggests that the fact that the district court 
issued a nationwide preliminary injunction enjoining a federal agency’s efforts to sell 
public lands, warranted special consideration by the Court. Blackmun explains that 
the fact that the district court and circuit court both had concluded that the underlying 
claims were “sufficiently substantial to warrant the entry of a nationwide injunction” 
should heavily weigh against deeming the plaintiffs insufficiently aggrieved to 
challenge the land sale in the first instance.77 
While some critics urge that the lower federal courts have simply failed to 
appreciate the remedy’s breadth, many decisions reflect just the opposite. Public law 
opinions underscore that nationwide injunctions are only warranted in truly 
 
70 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). 
71 Id. (“Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with principles of equity jurisprudence, since the 
scope of relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by the geographical 
extent of the plaintiff class. If a class action is otherwise proper, and if jurisdiction lies over the 
claims of the members of the class, the fact that the class is nationwide in scope does not 
necessarily mean that the relief afforded the plaintiffs will be more burdensome than necessary 
to redress the complaining parties.”). 
72 Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 307 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.).  
73 Id. at 319. 
74 Id. at 336 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
75 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).  
76 Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
77 Lujan, 497 U.S. at 913.  
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extraordinary circumstances.78 Where nationwide injunctions are issued pursuant to 
inherent judicial authority, courts appear to take considerable effort to tailor the 
remedy in light of traditional equitable principles.79 Some otherwise justify nationwide 
injunctions where regulations are challenged on the theory that courts are both 
expressly authorized to act80 and reason that it is otherwise necessary to broadly enjoin 
unlawful agency actions in total.81 Others reason that nationwide scope is reasonable 
where there is a nationwide class, believing anything short of a nationwide injunction 
would be insufficient to protect the class.82 Private law decisions similarly reflect 
careful consideration of nationwide injunction’s breadth. It should be noted that in the 
vast majority of private law cases where nationwide injunctions are issued, the remedy 
is expressly authorized by statute, which raises fewer concerns about judicial 
overreach.83 And yet, many courts approach even those cases with caution. As one 
example, lower courts routinely decline to issue nationwide injunctions in suits 
 
78 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 938 (7th Cir. 2020) (Manion, J., concurring) 
(“An injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, outdone only by an injunction issued on 
a national scale. This type of relief should be issued only when absolutely necessary and the 
court rightly recognizes it is far from necessary here.”). 
79 See, e.g., Bregsal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A]n injunction is not 
necessarily made over-broad by extending benefit or protection to persons other than prevailing 
parties in the lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if such breadth is necessary to give 
prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.”).   
80 This principle flows, in part, from the text of section 706 of the Administrative Procedures 
Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (reviewing courts “shall” “set aside” unlawful agency actions). See, e.g., E. 
Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1283 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Singular equitable 
relief is commonplace in APA cases, and is often necessary to provide the plaintiffs with 
complete redress.”); Pennsylvania v. President of the U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 575 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(“[C]ourts invalidate—without qualification—unlawful administrative rules as a matter of 
course, leaving their predecessors in place until the agencies can take further action.”); Earth 
Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing “the text of the” APA’s 
section 706 “compel[s]” nationwide injunctions of invalid rules), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“When a reviewing court determines 
that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that 
their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.”). 
81 See, e.g., Make the Rd. N.Y. v. McAleenan., 405 F. Supp. 3d 1, 72 (D.D.C. 2019) (entering 
national injunction against agency rule where plaintiff proved rule unlawfully promulgated on 
the logic that merely halting the rule’s application to the plaintiff may lessen the real-world 
impact of the unlawful rule as to the plaintiff but does not fully redress “the violation 
established”—the promulgation of an unlawful rule); see also Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 
2d 1, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2004) (entering a permanent injunction of the Department of Defense’s 
“involuntary anthrax inoculation program” as to “all persons” not just the plaintiffs).  
82 See, e.g., Doe #1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[A] provisionally certified 
nationwide class is sufficient justification for a nationwide injunction.”). 
83 See, e.g., Price, supra note 59 at 789–90 (pointing out that when federal courts exercising 
federal question jurisdiction in certain areas no comity concerns; also points out that some 
federal IP statutes expressly authorize nationwide injunctions as forms of relief). 
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brought under state law where the remedy would have applied the law of one state 
beyond its borders.84  
Given the foregoing, it is perhaps unsurprising that public reception to the 
nationwide injunction was relatively neutral up through the 2010s. Legal 
commentators and popular press dryly reported on nationwide injunctions against the 
federal government and even natural persons85 for decades expressing no concern 
about the remedy’s constitutionality. For instance, though somewhat unorthodox at 
the time, the Landis order was not deemed problematic by legal commentators.86 
Popular press in the 1970s through the early 2000s took a similar approach—
recognizing the breath of the remedy is significant, but not questioning its 
constitutionality.87  
 
84 In these decisions, courts head the rule that one state cannot legislate for others or project its 
laws across state lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing for itself the legal 
consequences of acts within it. Pac. Emps. Ins. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 504–
05 (1939); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the 
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 
1104–08 (2009); see, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Comput. Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1015 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“While California courts have repeatedly held that they have authority to issue 
injunctions which have effect beyond the borders of California, this remains an open question 
in this circuit. As we have no ruling before us, we leave the constitutionality of a nationwide 
injunction based on state law for another day and remand to the district court to consider, if 
necessary, whether it would grant injunctive relief, or later its scope, if the dilution were based 
solely on California law.”); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381, 385 (N.D. Ill. 
1985) (concluding that nationwide injunction of advertising practices would place an “excessive 
burden on commerce in light of the interest sought to be protected”). 
85 See, e.g., Jane Fritsch, Cover Story: The Man Who Sued Too Much Acting as His Own 
Lawyer, Anthony R. Martin-Trigona Flooded Several Courts with Hundreds of Lawsuits, 
Motions and Appeals. Frustrated Judges Struck Back by Taking an Extraordinary Action: They 
Imposed a Nationwide Curb on His Right to Sue, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1987, 1987 WLNR 141540 
(“Before the session ended close to 7 p.m., Cabranes had dismissed nearly all of Martin-
Trigona's federal cases in Connecticut and entered a nationwide injunction barring Martin-
Trigona from ever again suing any of the people involved in the Connecticut litigation or, for 
that matter, anyone at all in any state or federal court without first getting court permission. 
Cabranes instructed a Justice Department lawyer to inform court clerks across the country of 
the injunction. . . . MARTIN-TRIGONA is believed to be the first person whose actions have 
provoked a nationwide injunction.”). 
86 See, e.g., Note, The Discretionary Stay as a Strategic Device in Constitutional Litigation, 46 
YALE L.J. 897, 902 (1937) (“But the fact that the stay in the present case may be unorthodox as 
compared with stays regarded as proper in private law cases, does not seem to be an urgent 
objection in the perspective of constitutional politics.”). 
87 See, e.g., Keith B. Richburg, Title I in Chaos After Ruling on Religious-School Funding, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1985, at A21,1985 WLNR 1496412 (“A federal judge in Missouri 
ordered the Education Department last week to stop using public money to provide remedial 
instruction to children in religious schools, in light of the Supreme Court's decision last month 
that such programs violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of church and state. In 
Kentucky, another group of plaintiffs is citing the Supreme Court decision and asking a federal 
judge there to impose a nationwide injunction, barring the use of Title I money in religious 
schools. With schoolhouse doors set to open in a few weeks, these court cases and others have 
thrown the Title I program, under which federal money is provided to local school districts for 
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The public narrative about nationwide injunctions shifted dramatically at the tail 
end of the Obama administration and public outcry reached a fever pitch under the 
Trump administration.  
B. The Novelty Critique 
Since the early 2010s, there has been a considerable uptick in public speeches, 
congressional testimony, and op-eds urging that we do away with nationwide 
injunctions.88 By the late aughts, much of the public messaging criticizing nationwide 
injunctions coalesced around the talking point that the remedy is new, cooked up by 
activist federal judges to interfere with the executive’s policy agenda.89  
 
disadvantaged students, into chaos.”); David Phelps, Attorneys General Seek More Power in 
Consumer-Fraud Cases, MINNEAPOLIS STAR & TRIB., July 27, 1987, at M4, 1987 WLNR 
1360097 (“Members of the National Association of Attorneys General last week recommended 
that states be granted the authority to take consumer-protection cases into federal court, where 
they could seek nationwide injunctions against fraudulent practices. During a congressional 
hearing, a panel of give attorneys general testified that federal efforts were ineffective in 
protecting consumers from deceptive marketing practices, retail fraud and defective products.”; 
Minn. Att’y Gen. Hubert Humphrey III: “As individual states, we are hamstrung to solve 
nationwide problems.”); U.S. Drops Enforcement of New Abortion Rules, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 1988, at 8F, 1988 WLNR 341834 (“The administration acted Thursday, 
hours after a federal district judge in Boston issued a nationwide injunction permanently barring 
enforcement of the restriction. A rule enforcing it was to take effect Thursday.”); Matt 
O’Connor, NOW Seeks Court Curb on Protests at Clinics, CHICAGO TRIB., July 1, 1998 (§ 2), 
at 8, 1998 WLNR 6481497 (“Crain also said that injunctions have been imposed in at least 14 
locations around the country as a result of the law [Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act], 
making any nationwide injunction in this case an unneeded ‘layer of protection’. But lawyers 
for NOW and abortion clinics put on evidence that violence and threats have continued to be 
used by activists in anti-abortion protests in the four years since the law was enacted.”); Bob 
Egelko, Forrest Service Rebuked on Logging: Public Must be Able to Comment Without Suing, 
U.S. Court Says, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 11, 2006, at A2, 2006 WLNR 13886507 (construing 
nationwide injunction as pro-public access to government insofar as it is rebuke of Bush 
administration attempts to thwart public notice and comment on agency action). 
88 See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Assistant Attorney General Beth Williams 
Delivers Remarks on Nationwide Injunctions at the Heritage Foundation (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-beth-williams-delivers-
remarks-nationwide-injunctions-heritage [https://perma.cc/8B5S-AGQS] (“The entry of 
nationwide injunctions is a relatively rare phenomenon: nationwide injunctions did not exist 
even sixty years ago. Before 1963, no court in the country had issued such a broad injunction, 
and they were exceedingly rare until President Regan took office. Even after that, by Justice 
Department estimates, courts issued an average of only 1.5 nationwide injunctions per year 
against the Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations, and 2.5 per year against the 
Obama administration. In President Trump’s first year in office, however, judges issued a 
whopping 20 nationwide injunctions—an eightfold increase. This matches the entire eight-year 
total of such injunctions issued against President Obama during his two terms. We are now at 
30, matching the total number of injunctions issued against the first 42 presidents.”). 
89 See, e.g., GianCarlo Canapara, Time to End the Tyranny of District Court Judges’ 
Nationwide Injunctions, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/time-end-the-tyranny-district-court-judges-
nationwide-injunctions [https://perma.cc/NKW7-9ZYD] (claiming “the judiciary has grown 
more powerful than America’s Founders intended and, since the 1960s, this has included issuing 
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So, where did the novelty critique come from? It appears to have first been floated 
by remedies scholar Samuel Bray in his 2017 article Multiple Chancellors: Reforming 
the National Injunction.90 There, Bray claims that “[t]hrough the middle of the 
twentieth century, there do not appear to have been any national injunctions.”91 Critics 
of the remedy have seemingly just taken Bray’s account and ran with it. This is curious 
because Bray’s argument has some serious problems. Among others, it is premised on 
a dubious history of the nationwide injunction. Not only does Bray erroneously claim 
that the remedy emerged for the first time in the 1960s—a point that Sohoni’s research 
reflects is off by at least five decades—but he also fails to take into account the 
existence of historically equivalent remedies that have long been considered part of 
traditional equity practice. These errors are significant because Bray’s proposed 
solution—that we do away with the nationwide injunction entirely—turns on the 
premise that eliminating the remedy returns equity to its historic limits.92  
To date, the reason why the novelty critique has been seized upon, despite its 
dubious underpinnings, has been under-interrogated. I would like to suggest that the 
novelty critique was deployed by the Trump administration as part of its overarching 
strategy to smear the judiciary, with the end goal of deflating the judiciary’s capacity 
to meaningfully check the executive. Other commentators have observed that Trump’s 
aggressive attacks on the judiciary are not only unprecedented in modern times,93 but 
instead appear to be calibrated to “rally a fearful public into accepting his disregard of 
judicial authority.”94 I believe that the Trump administration’s escalating assaults were 
 
universal injunctions” and going on to argue that this improperly facilitates activist judges’ 
interference with Executive governance); David French, The Nationwide Dysfunction of the 
District-Court Injunction, NAT’L REV. (June 6, 2019), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/06/24/the-nationwide-dysfunction-of-the-
district-court-injunction/ [https://perma.cc/292K-T4VG] (“[T]hese judges have started to take 
for themselves a staggering amount of power.”). 
90 Bray, supra note 9.  
91 Id. at 437.  
92 Id. at 481–82. 
93 See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Clashes Early with Courts, Portending Years of Legal Battles, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/donald-trump-
mike-pence-travel-ban-judge.html [https://perma.cc/L3Y5-B63B] (“Trump’s serial attacks on 
judges and the judiciary take us into new territory.” (quoting Jack Goldsmith, head of the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel under President George W. Bush)); Julie Hirschfeld 
Davis, Supreme Court Nominee Calls Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary ‘Demoralizing,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/donald-trump-
immigration-ban.html [https://perma.cc/QRE4-F7YA] (“Mr. Trump is shredding longstanding 
norms of etiquette and interbranch comity.” (quoting former George W. Bush judicial appointee 
Michael McConnell)).  
94 Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
1183, 1245 (2017).   
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less about the specific subject-matter and more about creating public pressure to 
weaken the judiciary’s legitimacy and with that, authority.95  
The Trump administration’s crusade against nationwide injunctions is but one 
example of how it strategically attacked the judiciary with the aim of subordinating 
the courts’ authority within our constitutional scheme.96 Labeling the nationwide 
injunction as novel helped the Trump administration craft a narrative of judicial 
overreach. This is helpful, because it covers up the fact that we are actually witnessing 
a moment of unprecedented executive overreach and herculean efforts by the judiciary 
to check it.  
One way novelty is used as cover is as an explanatory account of why the federal 
courts issue more nationwide injunctions against the federal government today than in 
the past. Trump and his surrogates claimed the uptick in nationwide injunctions 
evidenced judicial overreach.97 This is sleight of hand. A more plausible explanation 
is that more nationwide injunctions are issued today than in the past because the 
executive branch has, for decades, been overreaching Article II’s limits.98 The 
 
95 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, When the Fire Comes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/opinion/when-the-fire-comes.html 
[https://perma.cc/GX9R-B9S8] (warning in the early days of the Administration that the court 
might very well be the only institution capable of checking Trump but that he is “doing all he 
can to delegitimize judicial oversight in advance,” citing as one example Trump’s attack on 
Judge James Robart, who issued a stay on one of the Muslim bans, calling him a “so-called 
judge”).  
96 This tack is well explored in the literature. See, e.g., Christopher D. Kromphardt & Michael 
F. Salamone, “Unprecedented!” Or: What Happens When the President Attacks the Federal 
Judiciary on Twitter, 18 J. INFO. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 84 (2020) (presenting survey experiment 
finding specific, but not diffuse, support for the proposition that public support in the Supreme 
Court changes in response to Trump attacks, but that changes are conditioned on respondents' 
preexisting support for democratic values). But see Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, Has 
Trump Trumped the Courts?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 34–40 (2018) (presenting and 
discussing results of nationally-representative survey of Americans reflecting that Trump’s 
criticisms of the court, regardless of content, had little effect on respondent’s support for the 
institution, but that there was a significant decline in support for the Court where respondents 
learned of criticism by law professors that the Court’s decisions are politicized).  
97 See, e.g., Katie Benner, Nationwide Injunctions Speak to Judiciary’s Growing Power, Barr 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/us/politics/barr-
nationwide-injunctions.html [https://perma.cc/Z9QG-HQFG] (quoting Barr: “Rather than an 
orderly pattern of litigation in which the government loses some cases and wins others, with 
issues percolating their way through the appellate courts, we have an interdistrict battle fought 
with all-or-nothing injunctions. . . . Nationwide injunctions undermine the democratic process, 
depart from history and tradition, violate constitutional principles, and impede sound judicial 
administration, all at the cost of public confidence in our institutions and particularly in our 
courts as apolitical decision makers.”).  
98 This trend has been well explored in a variety of areas. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, National 
Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 487–521 (2010) (arguing that 
relatively recent phenomenon of “presidential exclusivity” in the realm of national security 
arose as a result of Congress ceding authority to the Executive overtime, its political appeal for 
both branches, and how it operates as a shell game ultimately depriving the public of meaningful 
accountability from either branch).  
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
880 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [69:859 
Constitution vests Congress and the executive with joint power to frame and 
implement policy goals. When our system functions, the political branches are 
incentivized to broker policy compromises together. But our system has not been 
functional for decades. Congress has been unable to enact bipartisan legislation for a 
long time. This precipitous decline in congressional authority has perversely 
incentivized the executive to take unilateral actions—ever more dubious executive 
actions and regulations that push beyond Article II’s limits—to implement its policy 
goals.99 Because these executive power grabs have disrupted the Constitution’s vision 
of public policy being jointly determined by the executive with the legislature,100 
stakeholders turned to the judiciary, our third branch, to try to correct course,101 just 
as the Framers intended.102 Another possibility is that there are more nationwide 
injunctions today because there is far more public law litigation by well-funded 
nonprofits seeking the remedy. The increased aggressiveness of states’ attorneys 
general is another potential factor. Many states routinely turn to nationwide injunction 
suits to  check, largely on partisan lines,103 the executive’s signature policies, rules, 
and regulations.104 Nationwide injunctions might be more common today than they 
were in the 1960s for another reason—Congress drastically limited the availability of 
three-judge courts in 1976, pushing many cases of national import to single judges.105 
 
99 See Edward G. Carmines & Matthew Fowler, The Temptation of Executive Authority: How 
Increased Polarization and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the 
Expansion of Presidential Power, 24 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 369, 369–70 (2017) (arguing 
increased polarization and a decline in legislative capacity have acted as reinforcing influences 
that, under a divided government and parity of strength of parties at the national level, have 
fueled the expansion of executive authority at the expense of a national legislature). 
100 Michael J. Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in 
SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 15, 50 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015).   
101 See Doug Rendleman, Preserving the Nationwide National Government Injunction to Stop 
Illegal Executive Branch Activity, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 887, 897 (2020) (“National government 
injunctions respond to a paralyzed Congress as well as the federal executive’s practice of issuing 
executive orders and administrative regulations to make major unilateral policy changes that 
bypass the legislative process.”).  
102 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The 
doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote 
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, 
but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers 
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”).  
103 Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of 
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 46 (2018). 
104 See Carolyn Shapiro, Democracy, Federalism, and the Guarantee Clause, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 
183, 225 (2020) (observing that rise of nationwide injunction litigations has dramatically shifted 
power at state level, with the remedy allowing attorneys general to have “more immediate 
effects on nationwide policy than can governors and state legislatures”). 
105 Thanks to Maggie Gardner for suggesting that the rise and fall of three judge panels might, 
in part, explain why early nationwide injunctions were fewer farer between. For much of the 
twentieth century, three-judge courts were available for constitutional challenges to state laws 
and administrative orders and Acts of Congress. During that period, it seems likely that three-
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Attacks premised on novelty also helped the Trump administration shift blame for 
the executive’s political failures onto the judiciary. For instance, Trump and his 
surrogates charged that nationwide injunctions are problematic because they 
disincentivize the political branches from working out disputes amongst themselves. 
Former Attorney General Barr floated this objection in a Wall Street Journal opinion 
piece, complaining there that nationwide injunctions force a resolution to disputes that 
would otherwise be resolved by compromises struck between the executive and 
Congress.106 In Barr’s telling, the judiciary is an interloper, disrupting the natural 
allocation of responsibility for policy setting vested in the political branches.107 Key 
to this argument is that nationwide injunctions are new, and this is a problem that other 
administrations did not have to grapple with. Once again, this is sleight of hand. The 
executive bears blame for disrupting normal channels of political accountability. The 
executive has repeatedly used nationwide injunction suits for political cover. Collusive 
litigations are one example. The executive both outright invited suits against it and, in 
legacy cases, filed against a previous administration with policy preferences 
diametrically opposed to its own, capitulated to the “opposition’s” demands. 
Nationwide injunctions that issued in these cases are subterfuge—they simply help the 
executive make a policy call it could not otherwise make through normal political 
channels.108 A less discussed but no less concerning phenomena is the executive using 
 
judge courts adjudicated contentious issues that often take the form of nationwide injunctions 
suits today. Cf Note, Judicial Limitation of Three-Judge Court Jurisdiction, 85 YALE L.J. 564 
(1976) (describing the rise and fall of the three-judge court in federal practice and suggesting, 
in part, that declaratory judgments issued by a single judge instead); Comment, Stone v. 
Philbrook: Another Word on Three-Judge Courts and Declaratory Judgments, 124 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1448 (1976) (similar).The precipitous increase in nationwide injunctions, roughly, 
corresponds with Congress’s elimination of three-judge courts in all but a handful of cases. In 
1976, Congress repealed 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282, which used to prescribe the composition and 
procedure for three-judge courts. The replacement, 28 U.S.C. § 2284, now delineates more 
narrow parameters for when a three-judge court can be convened—only where “required by Act 
of Congress” or “when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the appointment of 
congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.” 
106 William P. Barr, Opinion, End Nationwide Injunctions, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/end-nationwide-injunctions-11567723072 
[https://perma.cc/9JF6-58CJ] (arguing nationwide injunctions ruin the chance for political 
compromise). 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., Edward Whelan, Don’t Defend, Don’t Appeal?, WASH. EXAM’R (Nov. 8, 2010), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/dont-defend-dont-appeal 
[https://perma.cc/242L-QDAM] (expressing concern by an ideological conservative that 
Obama administration would for policy reasons decline to appeal nationwide injunction of 
DOMA); Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, Why Fight It?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A21, 2010 
WLNR 21028195 (observing that if the Obama administration allows DOMA nationwide 
injunction to stand that it could “provide the political cover necessary for Congress to repeal 
this law because it would then be doing no more than changing the law to be in compliance with 
a federal court order”).  
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the threat of nationwide injunctions as cover for adopting extreme and otherwise 
legally specious regulations.109  
Novelty also helped the Trump administration publicly justify its unprecedented 
campaign of personal attacks on sitting federal judges. Trump and his surrogates 
claimed that individual federal judges who dare to check the administration are acting 
as arms of the party that nominated them,110 fanning the narrative that federal judges 
are illegitimate political actors that should be rebuked by political means.111 Key to 
this argument is that these judges are acting in ways judges did not in the past—as 
political actors112—which their use of the nationwide injunction evidences.113 
Novelty was also used to delegitimize judicial review of executive action. Former 
Attorney General Sessions’s rhetoric in the first years of the Trump administration 
well illustrates this. In a particularly caustic statement in April 2017, made just a few 
weeks after Judge Derick K. Watson of the District of Hawaii issued a nationwide 
 
109 See generally Timothy G. Duncheon, Litigation Risk as Justification for Agency Action, 95 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 194–234 (2020) (arguing that agencies should not be able to cite bare 
litigation risk as a justification for rescinding or making a new rule under the Administrative 
Procedures Act). 
110 See, e.g., Craig Trainor, Nationwide Injunctions: Obstruction by Other Means, WASH. 
EXAM’R (May 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/nationwide-
injunctions-obstruction-by-other-means [https://perma.cc/W6VR-VHBU] (“[T]he nationwide 
injunctions serve the political interests of the modern Democratic Party. The judiciary can ill 
afford such a naked partisan impression because it calls into question its legitimacy as a neutral 
arbiter of cases and controversies.”). 
111 See, e.g., Jordan Fabian & Jacqueline Thomsen, Courts Become Turbocharged 
Battleground in Trump Era, THE HILL (July 22, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/453881-courts-become-turbocharged-
battleground-in-trump-era [https://perma.cc/NVH8-MRFT] (Mike Davis, former Republican 
Senate and White House aide: “The more these judges weigh into these political matters . . .  
they undermine the legitimacy of the court and make it more likely that the president or 
Congress will make a political attack on the courts. . . . Don’t go into the political arena if you 
don’t want to take political punches.”). 
112 Federal judges have been accused of activism outside the context of nationwide injunctions. 
More generally, accusations of activism proceed on the premise that “unelected judges have 
usurped the functions of the political branches when they have used legal principles to effectuate 
their own preferred policy aims.” Jane S. Schacter, Politics of “Judicial Activism,” SUP. CT. 
REV. 209, 215 (2017). 
113 Charlton Copeland offers a different take. He argues: 
Understanding the context in which courts issue nationwide injunctions 
requires understanding courts as institutions embedded in an ecosystem that 
includes more than simply “rogue” judges or judicial doctrine. Courts are 
political institutions with their own agendas for building capacity to resolve 
societal challenges. This dynamic forces us to consider the ways that courts 
exist as both competitors to and allies with other political institutions. 
Charlton C. Copeland, Seeing Beyond Courts: The Political Context of the Nationwide 
Injunction, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 794 (2020). 
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injunction114 against the Second Muslim Ban, Sessions opined, “I really am amazed 
that a judge sitting on an island in the Pacific can issue an order that stops the president 
of the United States from what appears to be clearly his statutory and constitutional 
power.”115 Key to this account is that the nationwide injunction is a new, 
unprecedented remedy that threatens the constitutional order. This is, again, sleight of 
hand. Claims that federal courts lack the authority to enjoin executive overreach even 
where proven are, as Benjamin Spencer argues, a “call for the federal courts to 
abdicate [the] judicial check on the executive branch.”116  
Ironically, the novelty critique also helped the Trump administration make 
superficially bipartisan overtures117 aimed at uniting left and right against the 
nationwide injunction and, ultimately, the judiciary. Citing the fact that the Obama 
administration also encountered more nationwide injunctions than its predecessors, 
Trump and his surrogates claimed that nationwide injunctions are a “bipartisan 
problem,” symptomatic of judicial rather than executive overreach.118 The supposed 
novelty of the remedy does a lot of work here—it creates fictive common ground 
between Obama and Trump’s most ardent supporters, groups that are politically 
dissimilar, but united in seeing the nationwide injunction as the calling card of activist 
judges run amok.119   
The novelty critique also helped the Trump administration blame nationwide 
injunctions for sowing chaos in the courts, covering up the fact that the true culprit 
was the administration’s abusive litigation tactics. As Stephen Vladeck has 
documented, Trump’s longest-serving Solicitor General, Noel Francisco, aggressively 
asked the Supreme Court for an unprecedented number of emergency stays where 
nationwide injunctions have issued on the pretense that there is a mounting crisis 
caused by the new nationwide injunction remedy.120 For the most part, the Court 
 
114 Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1122–23 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 859 F.3d 741, 761 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (Mem.). 
115 Charlie Savage, Jeff Sessions Dismisses Hawaii as ‘an Island in the Pacific,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/us/politics/jeff-sessions-judge-hawaii-
pacific-island.html/ [https://perma.cc/86HR-AYVF]. 
116 Spencer, supra note 37.   
117 See Rendleman, supra note 101, at 900 (“Litigants’ views of national government 
injunctions usually depend on their views of the substantive merits in the lawsuit and whether 
they are a winning plaintiff or losing defendant. Because politicians are on both winning and 
losing sides of lawsuits, the national government injunction is bipartisan.”).  
118 See, e.g., Jeff Sessions, Nationwide Injunctions Are a Threat to Our Constitutional Order, 
NAT’L REV. (Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/nationwide-
injunctions-stop-elected-branches-enforcing-law/ [https://perma.cc/96L8-G5RR] (“This is not 
a political or partisan issue. After all, this has been a problem for administrations of both parties. 
Until President Trump, the President with the most nationwide injunctions was President 
Obama. Before him, it was President Clinton.”). 
119 See, e.g., Millhiser, supra note 27. 
120 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 
123, 153–55 (2019). 
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acquiesced to Francisco’s demands.121 Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Department 
of Homeland Security shows how novelty shifts blame for litigation from the Trump 
administration, where it properly belongs, onto the judiciary. To refresh, Gorsuch 
supported staying the nationwide injunctions at issue because, to his eye, the new 
nationwide injunction remedy had caused chaos below.122 But Gorsuch misdiagnoses 
the problem—as the District of Columbia later explained, the chaos Justice Gorsuch 
decried “was a product not of a nationwide injunction, which would quickly settle 
legal issues at play once and for all potential plaintiffs, but of emergency appeals by 
the federal government seeking stays of nationwide injunctions entered by district 
courts.”123 
C. How Novelty Fails to Explain Problems with Nationwide Injunctions 
There is one critical respect in which the novelty critique fails—the problems we 
encounter with nationwide injunctions are not necessarily unique to the remedy let 
alone caused by its supposed novelty.  
In his concurrence in Department of Homeland Security v. New York, Justice 
Gorsuch makes an empirical claim about the remedy—that the nationwide 
injunction’s novelty explains why they create problems that are otherwise not tolerable 
in federal litigation.124 Specifically, he argues that nationwide injunctions perversely 
incentivize forum-shopping,125 can give rise to conflicting injunctions,126 interfere 
with non-party rights,127 depress percolation of issues in lower courts,128 and weaken 
 
121 Id. at 134 (“Of the twenty-one stay applications, twelve sought to allow a policy that had 
been subjected to a nationwide injunction to remain in place, and six of the nine petitions for 
certiorari before judgment invoked the unique harm caused by nationwide relief as the reason 
the Court should bypass the courts of appeals.”). 
122 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he routine issuance of universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for 
litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by . . . conflicting decisions.”). 
123 District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 53 (D.D.C. 2020). 
124 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 140 S. Ct. at 600–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
125 Id. at 601 (“Because plaintiffs generally are not bound by adverse decisions to which they 
were not a party, there is nearly boundless opportunity to shop for a friendly forum to secure a 
win nationwide.”). 
126 Id. (“The risk of winning conflicting nationwide injunctions is real too.”). 
127 Id. at 600 (claiming nationwide injunctions are atypical insofar as they afford relief not 
“limited to the parties”). 
128 Id. (“By their nature, universal injunctions tend to force judges into making rushed, high-
stakes, low information decisions. The traditional system of lower courts issuing interlocutory 
relief limited to the parties at hand may require litigants and courts to tolerate interim uncertainty 
about a rule’s final fate and proceed more slowly until this Court speaks in a case of its own.”). 
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the certiorari process.129 However, these problems are not unique to nationwide 
injunctions.  
In some nationwide injunction suits there is clear evidence that plaintiffs forum- 
or judge-shopped their way to an injunction.130 Both tactics are problematic because 
they undermine the legitimacy of judicial proceedings and threaten public confidence 
in the courts.131 But these abuses are made possible not by the remedy but by 
background rules that govern federal litigation more broadly.  Forum-shopping is 
facilitated in part by our belief that plaintiffs should be masters of their cases, entitling 
them, within some limits, to openly jury- and law-shop.132 And federal rules already 
permit forum-shopping where civil suits are brought against federal officers or the 
government.133 Judge-shopping is facilitated by the power our federal system gives to 
district courts to manage their internal affairs. As Alex Botoman explains, fifty-five 
of the nation’s ninety-four federal district courts are subdivided into geographic 
divisions that are used for judge-assignment.134 This creates mini district courts within 
a district, each with its own judges. In these districts, litigants can select the pool of 
judges eligible to be assigned to their cases by strategically choosing the division in 
which they file.135  
Nationwide injunctions also sometimes lead to conflicting injunctions and orders, 
both of which are problematic because they sow confusion for the litigants, imperil 
the orderly administration of justice and waste precious judicial resources,136 and put 
 
129 Id. (construing the normal practice as encouraging the “airing of competing views that aids 
this Court’s own decision-making process”). 
130 See, e.g., Alex Botoman, Divisional Judge-Shopping, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 297 
(2018) (discussing how the State of Texas exploited divisional judge-assignment systems to 
secure favorable judges in three cases challenging Obama administrative initiatives). 
131 Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 267, 304–05 (1996); Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for 
Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 971 (1999) (noting that judge shopping “undermines the aphorism that 
‘ours is a government of laws, not men’”).  
132 See, e.g., Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (1990) 
(“Despite the widespread availability of forum shopping, courts and legislatures routinely 
denounce it. In fact, however, courts tolerate forum shopping in some types of cases more than 
in others. Thus, courts may be troubled not so much by the practice of forum shopping per se 
as by its results or its implications about society and the judicial system.”); J. Skelly Wright, 
The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 333 
(1967) (“The lack of uniformity in state and substantive law, compounded by proliferation of 
state long-arm statutes, has made forum-shopping, among both federal and state courts, a 
national legal pastime.”).  
133 28 U.S.C. §1391(e)(1). 
134 Botoman, supra note 130, at 299. 
135 Id. 
136 Cf. M. Devon Moore, The Preliminary Injunction Standard: Understanding the Public 
Interest Factor, 117 MICH. L. REV. 939, 960 (2019). 
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parties in the position of being held in contempt of court no matter which injunction 
or order they obey.137 But these problems are not unique to nationwide injunction suits. 
Both problems arise in non-nationwide injunction suits where two or more district 
courts exercise jurisdiction over the same issue and there is an overlap of at least some 
of the parties. Moreover, nationwide injunctions do not always give fruit to conflicting 
injunctions and orders. Other commentators have noted that despite the increased 
issuance of nationwide injunctions in the last few decades, conflicting injunctions 
have proved to be rare “in part because the comity doctrine requires judges to avoid 
issuing such injunctions when possible, and in part because courts can and do alter 
their injunctions when they learn of such conflicts.”138  
Due to their breath, nationwide injunctions suits can also sometimes infringe on 
the rights of non-parties. But their breadth is not always problematic. As Spencer 
Amdur and David Hausman point out, broad remedies seeking relief for large, 
dispersed victim classes are sometimes the only meaningful way to prevent serious 
injuries of a nationwide scale.139 Moreover, nationwide injunctions’ breadth is not a 
new innovation. Equity has long permitted actions that settle the rights of upwards of 
tens of thousands of similarly situated persons.140 
There is some merit to the critique that nationwide injunctions can stifle the 
percolation of issues in the lower courts. The Seventh Circuit pointed to this problem 
in City of Chicago v. Sessions, and reflected:  
When relief is limited in geographic scope, multiple cases may be filed in 
numerous jurisdictions, and the reviewing courts may therefore gain a wider range of 
perspectives and the opportunity to explore the impact of those legal issues in other 
 
137 Frost, supra note 1, at 1106. 
138 See Bray, supra note 9, at 463 (noting that typically one of the judges who issued conflicting 
injunctions “backs down, narrowing or staying one of the issued injunctions, or else an appellate 
court reverses one of them”); see also  W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Loc. 24, 751 F.2d 
721, 728 (5th Cir. 1985) (principle of comity requires that courts of “coordinate jurisdiction and 
equal rank . . . exercise care to avoid interference with each other’s affairs”); United States v. 
AMC Ent., Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 771–73 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing policy rationale of limiting 
injunctions to geographic jurisdiction in cases in which other circuits have issued conflicting 
rulings). 
139 David Hausman & Spencer Amdur, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 
HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 51 (2017) (“Some government policies, like President Trump’s travel ban, 
threaten immediate and lasting damage. They go into effect quickly, and their impact cannot be 
reversed at the end of a lawsuit. Anyone who does not or cannot bring her own case can only 
be protected if a court concludes the policy is illegal and fully enjoins it. Preventing widespread 
and illegal injuries is a good thing, especially when the government and others would not be 
much harmed in the process.”).  
140 Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and Appellee the City of 
Chicago, supra note 51, at 27–28 (discussing, as one example, the Rail Strike Injunction issued 
by a federal judge in Chicago in 1922, which enjoined “all railway employees, attorneys, 
servants, union agents, associates and members and all persons acting in aid or in conjunction 
with them” nationwide—at least 400,000 people—from doing anything that could possibly 
support the then-ongoing railroad strike, including “loitering,” “picketing,” and “encouraging” 
anyone to interfere with the functioning of the railroads). 
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factual contexts. That process may be truncated, however, if a district court issues a 
nationwide injunction.141  
But this problem is not necessarily unique to nationwide injunctions. For instance, 
suits brought against the federal government seeking a declaratory judgment 
interpreting a federal statute similarly depress percolation of issues. Similarly, suits 
with large plaintiff classes can similarly depress the percolation of issues across lower 
courts.142 
There is also some merit to the proposition that nationwide injunctions weaken the 
certiorari process. Nationwide injunctions can send the Court a false signal, making it 
seem as if there is uniformity between the circuits on a particular legal issue. 
Depressed percolation of issues in the lower courts can deprive the court of a robust 
body of decisions to inform its own decision-making and, as a result, weaken the 
certiorari process.143 But these problems are not necessarily unique to nationwide 
injunctions. Among other things, the Court can weaken the process itself if it takes too 
many petitions for certiorari before judgment, as it has with nationwide injunction 
suits recently.144  
In sum, the disconnect between the novelty critique and claimed problems with 
nationwide injunctions matters. Among other things, it suggests something else was 
at play driving the Trump administration’s crusade against the nationwide injunction; 
flimsy problems do not justify overcorrection of eliminating the remedy. There is also 
a common theme among these not real problems—all seem to speak to anxiety about 
the judiciary’s legitimacy and capacity of our modern-day chancellors to make the 
right call when sitting in equity. Even if the supposed problems are blown out of 





141 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th Cir. 2018). 
142 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1972) (noting that nationwide classes “have a 
detrimental effect by foreclosing adjudication by a number of different courts and judges”). 
143 See Getzel Berger, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A Structural 
Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1087–88 (2017); see also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN 
SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE 48 (1986) (explaining that the Court benefits 
from the experience of the lower courts—by virtue of encountering the same issues in wildly 
different contexts, they communicate “concrete information about how a particular rule will 
‘write,’ its capacity for dealing with varying fact patterns, and the merits of alternative 
approaches”); Patricia M. Wald, Upstairs/Downstairs at the Supreme Court: Implications of the 
1991 Term for the Constitutional Work of the Lower Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 771, 790 (1993) 
(observing that percolation allows the Court to “take advantage of a wide spectrum of reasoning 
and analysis on the subject as well as a variety of factual settings in which the issue may have 
arisen”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen 
frontier legal problems are presented, periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, 
state and federal appellate courts may yield a better informed and more enduring final 
pronouncement by this Court.”). 
144 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018). 
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III. FEDERAL EQUITY POWER AND NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS 
This Part endeavors to reclaim the nationwide injunction as a valid exercise of 
federal equity. In service of that goal, I explore the source and scope of federal equity 
jurisdiction and powers and Supreme Court caselaw expounding upon the same. 
Ultimately, historical and doctrinal context and critique show why nationwide 
injunctions are constitutional. 
A. Article III’s Equity 
I would like to suggest that federal equity is quite expansive—in exceptional cases, 
it extends as far as necessary to give justice to the parties. This clear, simple limit is 
set by Article III and evidenced by contemporary writings of the Framers and has been 
readily recognized by the Supreme Court, albeit with some equivocation, from the 
early Republic to present.  
The expansiveness of our equity may seem surprising given present anxieties about 
the appropriate role of federal judges. Somewhat ironically, in our turbulent times, the 
notion that our equity is dynamic enough to meet the exigencies of the moment may 
seem untoward to some. Unfortunately, a growing number of commentators prescribe 
a radical, historically dubious, and doctrinally unsound measure to guard against 
potential abuses of the equity power—they invented a fiction that our equity is now 
and always has been rigidly delimited by the equity of the English Chancellor circa 
1789. Some commentators are even so bold as to suggest that the Supreme Court has 
recognized as much in an unbroken set of precedents since the founding of the 
Republic.145 To put a very fine point on it, these commentators’ arguments are utterly 
ridiculous.  
Let us begin by assessing evidence reflecting federal equity’s limits.  
Article III’s text is a good starting place. Article III unqualifiedly vests the 
judiciary with the power to hear cases arising in “equity.”146 Aside from granting 
Congress the power to create and set the jurisdiction of the lower courts, the 
Constitution does not expressly delineate the remedies courts may award or set hard 
procedural limits. Textually, it is strange to read Article III’s broad, unencumbered 
grant as being limited by the kind of equity practiced in the English Chancery Court 
circa 1789. Article III does not make any express reference to the English Chancellor 
or the Chancery Court, or any other equity tradition for that matter.  
For what it’s worth, evidence of the Framers’ intent similarly weighs against 
construing Article III as importing idiosyncratic limits of the English Chancellor onto 
 
145 See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 224 (2018). 
146 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls; —to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; —to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; —to Controversies between two or 
more States; —between a State and Citizens of another State; —between Citizens of different 
States; —between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, 
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.”); see 
also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695 (1992) (“This section delineates the absolute 
limits on the federal courts’ jurisdiction.”). 
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federal equity.147 The Framers designed the federal judiciary to serve the unique needs 
of our Republic. While each state retained the power to create local law and, at its 
option, could maintain courts of law and equity, the national courts were calibrated to 
promote the interests of the American people and mediate disputes of national import 
between and among the states and their citizens.148 In this vein, Constitutional 
Convention delegate William Samuel Johnson, a Connecticut lawyer and skilled 
equity practitioner, proposed that the judiciary be vested with both legal and equitable 
jurisdiction and the contours of the lower courts’ equity jurisdiction be undefined, left 
to Congress to delimit.149 Johnson’s proposal was ultimately adopted and incorporated 
into Article III.150 The available historical record reflects that the Framers intended 
that the national courts have the requisite powers in extraordinary cases, where 
positive law fell short, to ensure justice could be done by the parties.151 They 
understood that Article III would confer the judiciary with expansive equity 
jurisdiction and powers, entrusting the federal courts to decree equitable remedies, 
thus enlarging their discretion when sitting in equity.152 
 
147 Thank you to Michael Dorf for pointing out that this observation harmonizes with the 
Supreme Court’s construction of the Seventh Amendment. As one example, in Galloway v. 
United States, the Court rejected the notion that directed verdicts are unconstitutional. There, 
the Court reasons that the availability of directed verdicts in English practice at the time of 
ratification is not dispositive because the Seventh Amendment did not import wholecloth 
English common law procedure, standards of proof, or evidentiary rules. 319 U.S. 372, 388–92 
(1943).   
148 In Federalist Paper 80, Hamilton further elucidates the necessity of and inherent limits of 
federal equity. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). There, he explains that some 
lawsuits brought under the Constitution and federal laws that do not “involve those ingredients 
of FRAUD, ACCIDENT, TRUST, or HARDSHIP” may contain inequity, therefore federal 
courts need equitable jurisdiction. Id. 
149 PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA 95 (1990). 
150 Id. 
151 Alexander Hamilton said as much in Federalist Paper No. 83, where he signals that the 
animating purpose of federal equity is to temper against the harsh results of rote application of 
positive law. In that vein, Hamilton explains “[t]he great and primary use of a court of equity is 
to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules.” THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton’s commentary echoes Aristotle’s understanding of 
equity being a justice that goes beyond written law necessary because positive law is always a 
general statement, yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement. 
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 313, 315 (T.E. Page et al. eds., H. Rackham trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1934) (c. 350 B.C.E.). Aristotle spoke of the need for “rectification 
of legal justice.” Id. at 315. Equity thus complements positive laws’ virtues, they are not in 
competition. Both are necessary to achieve Justice. For a superb exposition of Aristotle’s 
conception of equity, see Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of Equity 
(Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119 (1942). 
152 HOFFER, supra note 149, at 94. 
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Supreme Court caselaw also reflects that federal equity is expansive. Though, in 
some respects, the Court has said that federal equity is informed by tradition, it is not 
strictly delimited by the idiosyncratic limits of the historic English Chancellor.  
The Court’s earliest cases, decided between 1789 and 1801, teach that Article III 
vests the judiciary with expansive equity jurisdiction and powers. Though at times the 
Court acknowledges federal equity draws upon English Chancery practices as they 
existed at the time of ratification, it is steadfast that this is not constitutionally 
compelled. For instance, in Georgia v. Brailsford, the Court describes English equity 
as “affording outlines for the practice of this court” but clarifies the Court has the 
power to “make such alterations . . . as circumstances may render necessary.”153 
Grayson v. Virginia teaches that it is within the “powers vested in this Court” to 
“adapt” general process and rules of equity inherited from England “to the peculiar 
circumstances of this country, subject to the interposition, alternation, and control, of 
the Legislature.”154  
As the Court’s equity jurisprudence matures, a through-line emerges—federal 
equity extends as far as necessary to ensure justice to the parties. In case after case, 
the Court hammers that federal equity is dynamic. For instance, the Court holds in 
Seymour v. Freer that “a court of equity ha[s] unquestionable authority to apply its 
flexible and comprehensive jurisdiction in such manner as might be necessary to the 
right administration of justice between the parties.”155 This dynamic conception of 
federal equity crops up again in Union Pacific Railway v. Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pacific Railway, which teaches that equity evolves overtime “in order to meet the 
requirements of every case, and to satisfy the needs of a progressive social condition 
in which new primary rights and duties are constantly arising and new kinds of wrongs 
are constantly committed.”156 And again in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, which underscores 
that “[f]lexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished [federal equity jurisdiction].”157 
When justice demands it, the Court finds itself free to construe federal equity as 
reaching injuries and affording remedies that were beyond the historic English 
Chancellor. One example is injunctions against executive officers. Historically, the 
English Chancellor derived his authority from the Crown and consequently had no 
power to enjoin the Crown.158 Despite  that limit in the English tradition, the Court has 
repeatedly held federal courts are empowered to issue injunctions against executive 
branch officers.159 The Court has also approved innovative uses of old remedies. One 
 
153 Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 414 (1792). 
154 Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 320 (1796). 
155 Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 202, 218 (1869); see also Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 
U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 807 (1870) (noting that federal courts must rely on their “flexible jurisdiction 
in equity . . . to protect all rights and do justice to all concerned”). 
156 Union P. Ry. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & P. Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 564, 601 (1896).  
157 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
158 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 1003. 
159 See, e.g., Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. Co., 305 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1938) (holding 
railway could sue for injunction against federal officers to restrain prosecution for violation of 
federal law); Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442, 455–56 (1934) (enjoining federal officers from 
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example is the antisuit injunction against enforcement made famous in Ex Parte 
Young.160 As Mila Sohini explains, that remedy was “heralded as an innovation 
precisely because it used ’a traditional tool of equity—the antisuit injunction—in a 
highly nontraditional way: to bar the bringing of an enforcement action, which is to 
say, the non-tortious filing of a complaint by an attorney general of a state.”161  
There are some opinions where the Supreme Court invokes the English Chancellor 
in a curious way that merits some explanation. In these cases, the Court goes so far as 
to say, expressly, that a particular result is compelled because it was the practice of 
the historic Chancellor or part of the English tradition. These kinds of statements, 
however, should not be taken literally. Additional context reflects that, in many 
instances where this happens, the Court invokes the Chancellor to help legitimize an 
innovation in federal equity, not to usher in some constitutionally mandated return to 
English equity circa 1789.  
As one example, in the early nineteenth century, the Court issued a series of 
opinions establishing a uniform body of nonstate equity principles covering procedure, 
remedies, and even some primary rights and liabilities. This was a drastic change, and 
a much-needed innovation at the time. Kristen Collins does a superb job fleshing out 
how the Court saw a need for a uniform body of federal equity law, realized reform 
was not forthcoming through legislation, and ultimately indulged in a bit of self-help, 
crafting a uniform single body of federal equity law informed by federal and English 
sources, and details how repeated congressional acquiescence made this possible.162 
For my purposes, I want to focus narrowly on how the Court went about rhetorically 
legitimizing this move in its opinions. Curiously enough, the Court repeatedly invokes 
the English Chancellor. For instance, in Payne v. Hook, by way of explaining that 
federal equity is national and cannot be encumbered by variances of state equity, the 
Court proffers that the “equity jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts is the same 
that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses.”163 Historic English 
distinctions between law and equity are also invoked in Robinson v. Campbell,164 
 
withholding retired military pay and allowances); Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 
187 U.S. 94, 110–11 (1902) (enjoining the Postmaster General from withholding mail).  
160 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
161 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 1003–04. 
162 See generally Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, 
and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249 (2010).   
163 Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1869); see also Kirby v. Lake Shore & M.S.R. 
Co., 120 U.S. 130, 138 (1887) (invoking Payne v. Hook and further pointing to the holding’s 
explanatory power vis-à-vis the uniformity of federal equity, noting that “[u]pon any other 
theory the equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States could not be exercised according 
to rules and principles alike in every state”). 
164 Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222–23 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding 
defendant could not assert equitable title to land in common-law ejectment action in federal 
court because “remedies in the courts of the United States, are to be, at common law or in equity, 
not according to the practice of state courts, but according to the principles of common law and 
equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of 
those principles”).  
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Mississippi Mills v. Cohn,165 and Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow166 to similar 
effect—to drive home that federal equity jurisdiction is set by the Constitution, which 
recognizes a distinction between law and equity as was the practice in England and 
vests federal courts with jurisdiction over both such that it cannot be encumbered by 
states extending legal or equitable jurisdiction to local tribunals. 
The Court has resorted to artificial histories of equity on several other occasions. 
For instance, the Court condoned the antilabor injunction challenged in In re Debs, a 
remedy foreign to both English and American practice,167 on the rationale that it was 
of a kind “recognized from ancient time and by indubitable authority.”168 Similarly, in 
York v. Guaranty Trust, the Court announced the “outcome determinative” test, 
extending the Erie principle to federal cases in which equitable remedies were 
sought,169 which eviscerated the uniform federal equity doctrine established by Payne 
and its progeny. Guaranty Trust makes this move, in part, by disavowing the existence 
of a long history of federal judicial “power [in equity] to deny substantive rights 
created by State law or to create substantive rights denied by State law.”170 As Collins 
 
165 Miss. Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 206 (1893) (holding the plaintiff’s equity claim could 
be heard in federal court even though state statutes vested local courts with concomitant 
jurisdiction; referencing in part that the historic distinction between law and equity “as 
distinguished and defined in the mother country at the time of the adoption of the constitution 
of the United States,” as a means to explain that federal equity jurisdiction cannot be impaired 
by state legislatures’ vesting of law jurisdiction over the same matters in state courts). 
166 Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U.S. 574, 579 (1893) (holding federal court could 
hear bill in equity to hear mechanic’s lien even though state statutes vested local courts with 
concomitant jurisdiction). 
167 As one commentator explains:  
Labor injunctions broke the traditional rules governing injunctions in 
several notable ways. The labor injunctions expanded the notion of property 
well beyond its traditional confines. Also, while injunctions traditionally 
were narrow remedies, the labor injunctions were very broad in terms of the 
acts proscribed, and the number of people bound. Furthermore, equitable 
remedies traditionally could not be obtained where there would be adequate 
remedy available at law. Nonetheless, the labor injunctions generally drew 
upon the authority of criminal statutes, so that criminal prosecution could 
have addressed many of the strikes. [Seemingly], courts were willing to 
expand these injunctions beyond their historical confines because the 
injunction’s power, flexibility, and prospectivity made the device uniquely 
Suited to protect the interests of business from disruptive labor movements. 
Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class 
Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1131 (2005).   
168 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895).   
169 York v. Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
170 Id. at 105. 
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explains, this was done, largely, to “craft a story of continuity concerning the metes 
and bounds of nonstate, judge made law in federal courts.”171  
On balance, it appears that the Court has invoked the Chancellor at times when it 
needs to rhetorically legitimize innovations in equity. These cases reflect a curious but 
consistent deployment of the English Chancellor, not as a historical figure 
demarcating the metes and bounds of federal equity, but rather as a figure embodying 
equity’s aspirational aims.172 The English Chancellor operates as a symbol of equity’s 
overarching commitments to justice and fairness. He represents a promise by our 
modern-day chancellors that their conscience is guided by a measure of stability and 
a capacity for change that are characteristic of equity’s long tradition.173 
Despite the rhetorical force of invoking the English Chancellor, the Court has on 
several occasions clarified that federal equity is informed by, but not starkly delimited 
by English practice. For instance, in Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin Southern, 
Inc.,174 where an insurer tried to avail itself of federal equity jurisdiction to raise a 
defense to a policy not available in state court, the Court explains that federal equity 
jurisdiction is informed by the “principles” of the “system of judicial remedies” 
“devised [and] administered” by the English Court of Chancery at the birth of the 
Republic.175 But the Court softens the English connection, clarifying that it “guide[s] 
their decisions and enable[s] them to determine whether in any given instance a suit 
of which a district court has jurisdiction as a federal court is an appropriate one for the 
exercise of the extraordinary powers of a court of equity.”176 
In Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., the Court also 
recognizes that the limits of federal equity are informed by tradition but clarifies that 
English practice is but one consideration.177 In holding that federal courts lack the 
equity jurisdiction to award asset-freezing injunctions before judgment, also known 
as Mareva-type injunctions, Justice Scalia explains that the limits of Article III’s 
equity are divined by looking at historic English practice and that of the federal courts 
 
171 Collins, supra note 162, at 338. 
172 Cf. Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV.  997, 1018–
19 (2015) (“What the Court is constructing might be called an artificial history of equity. . . . It 
glosses, and glosses over, the real complexity of equity’s past.”). 
173 Id. at 1023. 
174 Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939) (“The ‘jurisdiction’ thus 
conferred on the federal courts to entertain suits in equity is an authority to administer in equity 
suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being 
administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries. 
[The Judiciary Act of 1789] does not define the jurisdiction of the district courts as federal 
courts, in the sense of their power or authority to hear and decide, but prescribes the body of 
doctrine which is to guide their decisions and enable them to determine whether in any given 
instance a suit of which a district court has jurisdiction as a federal court is an appropriate one 
for the exercise of the extraordinary powers of a court of equity.”). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999). 
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as well as the equitable ramifications of extending federal equity to a previously 
unknown remedy.178 Thus, though the practices of the historic English Chancellor has 
some bearing on how Article III’s limits are construed, it is but one factor and not 
itself dispositive. In recognizing that the contours of federal equity are informed by 
historic English practice but adapted to the unique needs of our Republic,179 Grupo 
Mexicano falls in line with Grayson180 and its progeny. (This insight also explains why 
Justice Scalia reasoned Mareva injunctions were beyond the limits of Article III 
despite the fact that, decades earlier, English courts had found them within the limits 
of English equity.181) 
The limited influence of English practice on the metes and bounds of federal equity 
is more strikingly apparent in the Court’s domestic relations and probate cases. Over 
the last century, the Court has taken pains to clarify in these cases that federal equity 
jurisdiction is not exclusively defined by the historic limits of the English Chancellor. 
Context helps explain why this was necessary in the first place. Starting in the mid-
nineteenth century, the Court issued several decisions approving of lower federal 
courts abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over probate and domestic relations 
cases that raised important federalism concerns when sitting in equity.182 However, 
the Court’s equivocation about two distinct concepts—the ancient power of courts 
 
178 Three factors thus inform the analysis: (a) whether the remedy was unknown to the English 
Chancellor of 1789, (b) whether federal and state courts had consistently denied Mareva-type 
relief throughout the twentieth-century, and (c) whether Mareva-type injunctions, if allowed, 
would alter the procedural and substantive rights of creditors relative to debtors. See id. at 322–
23. 
179 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 1006 n.554 (observing the same). 
180 Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 320 (1796). 
181 See Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. Int’l Bulkcarriers SA [1980] 1 All ER 213 (CA). For 
in-depth accounts of the emergence of the Mareva injunction, see John Stevens, Equity’s 
Manhattan Project: The Creation and Evolution of the Mareva Injunction, 14 DENNING L.J. 25 
(1999) and David Capper, The Mareva Injunction — From Birth to Adulthood, in LEADING 
CASES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 255 (Eoin O’Dell ed., 2000). It should be noted that lawyers 
in common law jurisdictions have long critiqued Scalia’s understanding of the Mareva case and 
the history of the remedy set forth in Grupo Mexicano. See, e.g., Lawrence Collins, United 
States Supreme Court Rejects Mareva Jurisdiction, 115 L.Q. REV. 601, 604 (1999) (noting that 
“from an English viewpoint, the discussion . . . of the Mareva jurisdiction seems to be superficial 
and based on obsolete material”); David Capper, The Need for Mareva Injunctions 
Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2166–76 (1999) (pointing to several errors and 
omissions in Scalia’s analysis in Grupo Mexicano). 
182 See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (“We disclaim altogether 
any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the 
allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce 
a vinculo, or to one from bed and board.”); De la Rama v. De la Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906) 
(claiming “long established rule” that federal courts lack jurisdiction over certain domestic 
relations matters premised on the assumptions that “husband and wife cannot usually be citizens 
of different States, so long as the marriage relation continues (a rule which has been somewhat 
relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that a suit for divorce in itself involves no 
pecuniary value”). 
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sitting in equity to decline to exercise jurisdiction in certain circumstances183 and the 
historic English Chancellor as a symbol to legitimize new equity decisions—sowed 
confusion. For a period, the Court’s decisions intimated that Article III, informed by 
“misty understandings of English legal history,” did not extend to either probate or 
domestic relations cases. 184 The Court later corrected course, rejecting the notion that 
implicit historic limits should be read onto Article III’s otherwise expansive grant of 
jurisdiction. In Ankenbrandt v. Richards,185 the Court recognized that because Article 
III does not expressly reserve jurisdiction over domestic relations matters, the 
exception is not constitutionally mandated186 and deemed the “historical debate over 
whether the English court of chancery had jurisdiction to handle certain domestic 
relations matters” irrelevant.187 Similarly, in Marshall v. Marshall, the Court deemed 
the “historical debate” over the practices of the “English Court of Chancery” irrelevant 
to assessing whether, constitutionally, federal courts had jurisdiction over equitable 
claims arising in the probate context.188 
Other aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence reflect that Article III’s equity is in 
some important respects totally different from that of the historic English Chancellor. 
One example is the so-called adequacy requirement. In traditional English practice, 
the Chancellor inherently lacked jurisdiction over matters in which there was an 
“adequate” legal remedy available.189 Not so with Article III’s equity. The 
Constitution extends unencumbered equitable jurisdiction to the federal courts. We do 
have an adequacy requirement, but it is statutory. Shortly after the Constitution was 
ratified, Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created the lower federal 
courts and conditioned their jurisdiction over equity matters such that it could only be 
exercised where there is no adequate legal remedy available.190 Sometimes, the federal 
adequacy requirement, because it is very old, is spoken of as if it is constitutional. But 
that is not quite right. Congress enacted the adequacy requirement pursuant to its 
 
183 The abstention power is a narrow but important exception to the general rule that federal 
courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. 
River Water Conservation v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1976) (citing England v. La. 
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); then citing McClellan v. Carland, 217 
U.S. 268, 281 (1910); and then citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). 
184 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 299 (2006) (Ginsburg, J.) (characterizing error). 
185 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695–96 (1992). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 699–700. 
188 Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308–09. 
189 F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 4–7 (2d rev. ed. 1936) (tracing requirement to early English 
Chancery practice). 
190 See Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568–69 (1939) (discussing statutory 
origins of adequacy requirement under federal law). 
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Constitutional power to set the lower courts’ jurisdiction; it could exercise that same 
power at any time to lift or alter it, just like any other statute.191 
Another key difference is the role the Supreme Court plays in shaping federal 
equity. When the Constitution was ratified in 1789, there was one English Chancellor 
who had jurisdiction over all equity cases in the realm.192 Appeals, if heard, were 
brought directly to the Crown, as famously occurred in 1616 when King James I issued 
a prerogative ostensibly affirming Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s 1515 opinion in the 
Earl of Oxford’s Case.193 Article III sets up a totally different kind of system. It vests 
all federal courts with the same equity powers, giving us multiple chancellors hearing 
equity cases concurrently. Additionally, as Justice Iredell explains in his concurrence 
to Sims’ Lessee, Article III’s election to vest both law and equity powers “in the very 
same Courts” puts unique pressures on our national judiciary requiring, at times, the 
Supreme Court to play a coordinating role as our Chief Chancellor.194  
Owing to its positional authority as the Chief Chancellor, the Supreme Court from 
time to time creates uniform rules to help guide the discretion of the inferior 
chancellors. These rules are, more often than not, fashioned to promote uniformity 
across the national equity courts, a problem that did not arise in England’s unitary 
system. Given this unique need, the Court’s cases that aim to promote uniformity in 
federal equity practice often have no real connection to historic English practice. As 
one example, in the early aughts the Supreme Court introduced new, uniform multi-
factor tests to guide the lower courts’ exercise of discretion in issuing preliminary 
injunctions in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council195 and permanent 
injunctions in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.196 Though both preliminary and 
 
191 John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the 
Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 209 (1997) (“Congress may give [inferior federal 
courts] all the jurisdiction the Constitution permits, or none at all, or anything in between, as far 
as Article III is concerned.”). 
192 Bray, supra note 9, at 420. 
193 Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486; 1 Chan. Rep. 1, 6; David Ibetson, The 
Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615), in LANDMARK CASES IN EQUITY 1, 1–3 (Charles Mitchell & Paul 
Mitchell eds., 2012) (exploring in depth the underlying land dispute as well as the convoluted 
litigation that eventually gave fruit to Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s 1515 decision in the Earl of 
Oxford’s Case that equity court decisions could override conflicting decisions issued by law 
courts, which created direct conflict with an earlier issued disposition of the same land dispute 
by Chief Justice Coke of the King’s Bench); GARY WATT, TRUSTS AND EQUITY 6 (2020) 
(describing how in 1616 the dispute between Chancellor Ellesmere and Chief Justice Coke was 
ostensibly appealed to King James I and, on the advice of his Attorney General, Sir Francis 
Bacon, James issued a prerogative approving of Ellesmere’s decision in the Earl of Oxford’s 
Case). 
194 Sims v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425 (1799). 
195 Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
196 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
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permanent injunctions have roots in English practice, the multi-factor tests adopted by 
the Court are not of English origin.197  
The Supreme Court also construes its equity powers to be expansive enough to 
permit the creation of totally new remedies unknown in English practice where they 
are necessary to salve unique needs arising in our Republic. One example is the 
structural injunction. The Court created the structural injunction in the mid-twentieth 
century as a tool to redress racial segregation in large public institutions in the wake 
of Brown v. Board of Education.198 The Warren Court’s commitment to racial justice 
moved it to engage in a transformational process, urging changes in core social 
institutions and in so doing revolutionized equity. As Owen Fiss explains: 
 
In time it was understood that desegregation was a total transformational process 
in which the judge undertook the reconstruction of an ongoing social institution. 
Desegregation required a revision of familiar conceptions about party structure, 
new norms governing judicial behavior, and new ways of looking at the 
relationship between rights and remedies. No one had a road map at the outset. No 
one had a clear vision of all that would be involved in trying to eradicate the caste 
system embedded in a state bureaucracy, or how the attempt would transform the 
mode of adjudication. It delegated the reconstructive task to the lower federal 
judges . . . . They, in turn, discovered what the task required and adjusted 
traditional procedural forms to meet the felt necessities. Legitimacy was equated 
with need, and, in that sense, procedure became dependent upon substance. It was 
the overriding commitment to racial equality that motivated the procedural 
innovation and that was seen as the justification for the departures from 
tradition.199 
 
Though structural injunctions issue far less frequently than they did in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Court has signaled its unwillingness to do-away with the remedy. And, 
the Court has continued to innovate the remedy to solve other, large-scale institutional 
problems. For instance, in Brown v. Plata, the Court upheld a structural injunction 
 
197 See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Restitution Rollout: The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & 
Unjust Enrichment: The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1027, 1037 (2011) (“It was news to remedies and injunctions scholars that the four-factor test 
[in eBay and Winter] was the required, ‘traditional,’ ordinarily applied familiar test.”); Mark P. 
Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205–06 (2012) (pointing out that traditional equitable practice 
embraces principles and concerns beyond the four factors articulated in eBay); Jared A. 
Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485, 492 (2010) (pointing 
out that Winter’s insistence that courts balance remedies is a nineteenth century creation, and 
that both “English and American courts in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth 
centuries neither spoke of balancing the equities nor employed a balancing approach in deciding 
whether to grant injunctions.”). 
198 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
199 Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979). 
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ordering the State of California’s prison system to reduce its population to remedy 
systemic Eighth Amendment violations.200  
In sum, the suggestion that Article III’s equity is strictly defined by the limits of 
the historic English Chancellor has no support in the Constitution’s text, the Framers’ 
intent, let alone Supreme Court caselaw. Those who insist otherwise are not urging 
that we return equity to its roots, but rather wish that we place a curious limit on federal 
equity and hope that an artificial history will give it the patina of legitimacy. Appeals 
to history, even untrue ones, rhetorically ease “the stultifying task of marking the 
limits of judicial power.”201 But, as James Pfander and Jacob Wentzel explain,  
A jurisprudence of constitutional remedies that measures the legitimate scope of 
modern federal equity by looking to the practices of the High Court of Chancery, circa 
1789, will capture only a partial view of the remedies available to suitors in the early 
republic. More troubling[,] it may deprive equity of its characteristic ability to adapt 
to changes in the remedial system as a whole.202 
The costs of these disingenuous histories are simply too great. 
B.  Nationwide Injunctions Are Constitutional 
Critics of nationwide injunctions raise three primary challenges, any one of which 
they insist reflects that nationwide injunctions are unconstitutional. I address each 
challenge and ultimately conclude that nationwide injunctions are constitutional.  
1. English Chancellor Objection 
The most popular challenge to the constitutionality of nationwide injunctions 
proffers that because the nationwide injunction is a remedy unknown to the English 
Chancellor at the time the Constitution was ratified in 1789, federal courts lack the 
power to issue the remedy today. Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii 
embraces a version of this argument. Because, Thomas asserts, no statute expressly 
gives federal courts the power to issue nationwide injunctions, the authority to do so 
must be located in Article III’s grant of inherent authority to issue equitable relief.203 
He goes on to reason that Article III only vests federal courts with the power to issue 
remedies that accord with the “traditional rules of equity that existed at the 
founding.”204 Because, on Thomas’s view, the “English system of equity did not 
contemplate [nationwide] injunctions,” Article III does not vest federal courts with the 
power to issue the remedy today.205 
However, the fact that the historic English Chancellor did not issue nationwide 
injunctions does not evidence the remedy’s unconstitutionality. As discussed at length 
 
200 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
201 Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on 
Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1294 (2000). 
202 James E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72 
STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1282 (2020). 
203 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018). 
204 Id. at 2425–26. 
205 Id. at 2427. 
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supra Section III.A, the metes and bounds of Article III’s equity is not exactly 
concomitant with that of the historic English Chancellor. And, as Grupo Mexicano 
recognizes, at most, historic English practice informs, but does not singularly delimit 
the metes and bounds of Article III’s equity.206 This is why the Court has a long 
tradition of permitting remedies that were absolutely unavailable to the Chancellor, 
such as injunctions enjoining executive branch officers. 
2. Breadth Objection 
Another constitutional challenge has also been floated—that, irrespective of 
origin, federal courts are without the power to issue injunctions that reach beyond the 
plaintiffs. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence to Department of Homeland Security v. New 
York, the order staying nationwide injunctions of the public-charge rule, embraces a 
version of this argument. There, Gorsuch argues that the fact that nationwide 
injunctions “direct how the defendant must act toward persons who are not parties to 
the case . . . raise[s] serious questions about the scope of courts’ equitable powers 
under Article III.”207 The problem, Gorsuch suggests, is that “[e]quitable remedies, 
like remedies in general, are meant to redress the injuries sustained by a particular 
plaintiff in a particular lawsuit.”208  
While the breadth of nationwide injunctions may at times prove administratively 
problematic and even invite abusive litigation tactics, it does not render the remedy 
unconstitutional. Precedents already establish that equitable remedies can be broad so 
long as they are tailored to the violation sown and need not be limited by the 
geographic extent of the plaintiff class. This flows from Califano v. Yamasaki, a case 
addressing a question about nationwide class actions.209 There the Court observed it is 
equity’s rule that injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant 
than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”210 Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that nationwide class actions were not “inconsistent with the principles of 
equity jurisprudence, since the scope of the injunctive relief is dictated by the extent 
of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.”211 
Similarly, equitable remedies are not constitutionally infirm simply because they 
reach nonparties. “Fashioning equitable relief is not and has never been an exercise in 
formalistic matching, of formulaically ordering relief scoped precisely to the injury 
the plaintiff has asserted and proven.”212 In allowing an equitable remedy affecting 
non-parties, the Court has explained that “[c]rafting a preliminary injunction,” or any 
other form of equitable relief, “is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often 
 
206 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 1006 n.554 (observing the same). 
207 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
208 Id. 
209 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 55 (D.D.C. 2020). 
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dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues 
it presents.”213 
3. Tradition Objection 
A hybrid challenge, combining the first two described above, posits that 
nationwide injunctions are unconstitutional because, pursuant to Grupo Mexicano, 
federal courts lack the power to issue remedies that were both unavailable to the 
English Chancellor and which lack a connection to traditional federal equity 
practice.214 Justice Thomas’ concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii also embraces a version 
of this argument. In addition to deeming the nationwide injunction foreign to historic 
English practice, Thomas argues that it is alternatively infirm because it is 
insufficiently grounded in federal equity practice.215 Because, Thomas urges, the 
remedy was first deployed in the 1960s and has only been increasingly issued in the 
last few decades, he claims it is insufficiently grounded in federal equity practice.216 
The novelty of the nationwide injunction, to Thomas’s eye, evidences its 
unconstitutionality.  
This “tradition” objection to nationwide injunctions is also infirm. Even if federal 
equity should be tempered by traditional practice in the federal courts, the nationwide 
injunction still survives. As Justice Scalia explains in Grupo Mexicano, to divine 
whether a remedy falls sufficiently within the “traditional” practice of federal courts 
one must look at three factors: (a) whether the remedy was unknown to the English 
Chancellor of 1789, (b) whether federal and state courts had consistently denied this 
kind of relief throughout the twentieth-century, and (c) whether the remedy, if 
allowed, would alter the procedural and substantive rights of the parties.217 The 
nationwide injunction passes muster. Although nationwide injunctions would be 
foreign to the historic English Chancellor, they are neither foreign to American equity 
practice nor do they inexorably alter the procedural or substantive rights of the parties.  
Nationwide injunctions are not totally foreign to American equity practice. They 
are not even particularly new.218 Mila Sohini’s “lost history” of nationwide injunctions 
reflects that they have existed for the better part of a century, bringing the remedy well 
within the contours of traditional practice as defined in Grupo Mexicano, which 
surveyed cases and treatises spanning through the mid twentieth century to ascertain 
whether the remedy had ever been issued by federal or state courts.219 Additionally, 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of nationwide injunctions to date supports an inference 
of the remedy’s constitutionality. The Court encountered nationwide injunctions on 
 
213 Id. (quoting Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017)). 
214 Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1999). 
215 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018). 
216 Id. at 2426. 
217 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322–33. 
218 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
219 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 324–25; Sohoni, supra note 17, at 924. 
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several occasions from the 1910s to present and has never intimated that the remedy 
violates Article III, giving rise to an inference of the remedy’s constitutionality.220  
Even if the nationwide injunction were a truly new remedy, that would not make 
it unconstitutional. The Court has, on plenty of occasions, condoned using old 
remedies in new ways to respond to urgent problems, as was the case with the antisuit 
injunction against enforcement made famous in Ex Parte Young.221 The Court has also 
approved totally new kinds of injunctions, such as the anti-labor injunction at the heart 
of In re Debs.222 On occasion, the Court has even played a direct role in creating new 
remedies, as it did in the mid-twentieth century with the structural injunction. This is 
all well within Article III’s tradition limits because equity jurisdiction of the federal 
courts has long been understood to extend as far as necessary to give justice to the 
parties.223 At bottom, this means that if there is no adequate remedy available at law, 
then parties can resort to equity and, guided by equitable principles, courts are 
empowered to grant relief.224 Because nationwide injunctions align with this 
longstanding  principle of American equity, they are sufficiently traditional. 
Lastly, nationwide injunctions are constitutional because they do not inexorably 
alter the procedural or substantive rights of the parties. As discussed above, the Court 
has long condoned broad equitable remedies, including those that reach nonparties, 
thus the existence of nationwide injunctions does not inexorably alter the rights of 
defendants in nationwide injunction suits. And, the government’s complaint—that 
nationwide injunctions uniquely impair their rights since they allow a single federal 
court to enjoin it across all jurisdictions—is also infirm. It is the ordinary practice to 
enjoin federal agencies from engaging in unlawful conduct in total, not simply as to 
individual petitioners.225 
C. The Stakes 
As the foregoing reflects, the constitutional question is fairly easily answered in 
the affirmative—the nationwide injunction is not categorically barred by Article III. 
Even though the constitutional question is easily answered, the stakes are exceedingly 
high. The difficulty here is with the proxy fight over what that answer means. If the 
remedy is permitted, the judiciary signals it is holding ground, continuing to act when 
necessary to check executive overreach.  
 
220 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 324–25. 
221 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
222 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
223 See, e.g., Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 202, 218 (1869) (“[A] court of equity ha[s] 
unquestionable authority to apply its flexible and comprehensive jurisdiction in such manner as 
might be necessary to the right administration of justice between the parties.”); see also Hecht 
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished 
[federal equity jurisdiction].”). 
224 See, e.g., Watson v. Sutherland, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 74, 79 (1867) (district courts properly 
exercise their equitable jurisdiction where “the remedy in equity could alone furnish relief, and 
. . . the ends of justice require[] the injunction to be issued.”). 
225 See discussion supra Section II.C. 
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I do not believe that the Trump administration urged the Court to assess the 
constitutionality of nationwide injunctions in good faith. The administration hoped 
that, with public pressure mounting, the Court would cede the federal courts’ power 
to issue the remedy, and with it, the authority to check the executive in and outside of 
suits seeking nationwide relief. While power grabs are not totally unexpected, the 
prospect of the judiciary acquiescing to the executive’s calls to abdicate its judicial 
check endangers the maintenance of our constitutional order.226 The judiciary cannot 
serve its constitutional function if it allows the executive to neuter it. Allowing the 
political branches the power to categorically strip courts of the power to issue 
nationwide injunctions would, as the Supreme Court has warned in other contexts,  
“permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime 
in which Congress and the President, not th[e] [c]ourt[s], say ‘what the law is’.”227 
The Trump administration’s crusade against nationwide injunctions was an attack on 
Article III that the judiciary cannot shy away from.  
Given these stakes, the Supreme Court should do something more than simply hold 
that nationwide injunctions are constitutional. The Court must do some repair work to 
restore the public’s confidence in the judiciary as an institution. As I explore in Part 
IV, one means to do this could be to introduce a new kind of abstention calibrated to 
prevent abuses of the nationwide injunction. 
IV. ABSTENTION PROPOSAL 
This Part presents the nationwide injunction abstention proposal. It opens by 
setting out key premises undergirding the proposal. From there, it introduces the 
abstention proposal, a prudential, discretionary kind of abstention modeled in part off 
of Colorado River abstention, consisting of seven disjunctive factors. The factors are 
calibrated to deter abusive litigation tactics, prevent untoward interference with non-
party rights and forum-shopping, and should promote horizontal comity between the 
district courts as well as percolation of issues. District courts would, under this 
proposal, be empowered to dispose of these suits in some instances and in others 
simply decline to consider the relief sought. It then proceeds to explain how district 
courts should go about balancing the abstention factors. It concludes by analyzing 
advantages of using abstention to tame the nationwide injunction and briefly identifies 
and responds to likely objections.     
A. Premises 
At the outset I think it important to identify key premises that undergird my 
abstention proposal. At the threshold, I presume that nationwide injunctions are not 
always problematic and thus any solution that would categorically bar the remedy is 
at best an overcorrection. As discussed at length supra Section II.A, nationwide 
 
226 District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 53 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Any 
recent chaos stemming from nationwide injunctions is the product of an executive branch 
aggressive in pursuit of appeals and in advancing its present arguments in derogation of judicial 
power. Perhaps that sort of power grab is to be expected from the executive branch. What is 
unexpected, and dangerous to the maintenance of our constitutional order, is that instead of 
fighting back, some courts have rolled over.”). 
227 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
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injunctions have existed in one form or another for more than a century in both public 
and private law contexts. While the frequency with which district courts issue these 
injunctions has increased overtime, the remedy itself has not proved to be 
inappropriate in all contexts. I took this to heart when trying to devise a solution to 
outlier situations where some kind of course correction is necessary. Rather than 
categorically bar the remedy, it seemed to me that we needed a solution that permits 
nationwide injunctions to be issued.  
A related premise is that the lower federal courts have the institutional competency 
and incentive to self-police against many of the problems nationwide injunctions can 
sow. By this I mean that federal judges are capable of spotting potential abuses in their 
midst early on in some of the most problematic nationwide injunction suits. While 
there will perhaps be some judges who relish opportunities to overreach, they are 
outliers. This is key because it opens up the possibility that we might guard against 
many nationwide injunction abuses by simply giving our federal judges tools to flush 
out abuses at early stages in the litigation.  
Another premise is that just as nationwide injunctions are not a new remedy, the 
solution itself need not be new—old tools likely can help. Much of the discourse about 
nationwide injunctions has assumed that the novelty of the remedy is a large part of 
why the courts have struggled to tame it. That is, they think the system is flummoxed 
by nationwide injunctions because the courts simply lack the necessary tools to 
accommodate the remedy in a system not designed for it. I do not think that is quite 
right. Nationwide injunctions have existed for the better part of a century and have 
only put serious pressure on the courts in the last decade or so. Moreover, the problems 
nationwide injunctions currently present are quite similar to ones that have arisen 
throughout the history of federal equity practice. For instance, the prospect of 
conflicting remedies arising in the context of concurrent jurisdiction is nothing new—
federal courts have long dealt with that by invoking abstention.  
An additional consideration is that the proposed remedy should not favor any 
particular party.228 I think this point is particularly important for two reasons. First, it 
is a bedrock principle that equity be equally accessible to all who invoke it.229 While 
my proposal aims to temper access to nationwide injunctions, I think it wrongheaded 
to single out any party for special treatment or disability. Doing otherwise would be 
incongruous with hundreds of years of equity jurisprudence.230 Second, as Justice 
Sotomayor231 and Stephen Vladeck232 have argued, the Supreme Court has up to this 
 
228 See, e.g., Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 807 (1870) (federal courts must 
rely on their “flexible jurisdiction in equity . . . to protect all rights and do justice to all 
concerned.”). 
229 See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 26 (1823) (“It is not only a maxim of the 
Court of Chancery, but of every wise legislator, that equality is equity.”). 
230 See, e.g., Brown-Crummer Inv. Co. v. City of Purcell, 128 F.2d 400, 404 (10th Cir. 1942) 
(“A court of equity is a forum of conscience. It acts when and as conscience commands. It exacts 
of those coming within its portals and applying for relief that they come with clean hands and 
right conduct.”). 
231 Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 684 (2020).   
232 Vladeck, supra note 120, at 155 (“[T]he true justification for emergency or extraordinary 
relief there is not that the lower courts have unduly hamstrung the executive branch from the 
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point inordinately privileged the federal government’s position in nationwide 
injunction suits. This is normatively problematic. But, more urgently still, it too often 
leads to the very abuses of process that opponents of nationwide injunctions decry in 
the first instance. For those reasons, my proposal puts the federal government on equal 
footing with other parties. 
Another premise is more practical—the solution should facilitate information 
gathering from the district court and reviewing court. As discussed supra Section II.B, 
one of the key problems sown by nationwide injunctions is that they shoot up 
important legal questions too quickly to the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, 
depriving both of varied, well-reasoned opinions exploring the metes and bounds of 
the legal issue and public interests at stake. Nationwide injunction suits too often 
position individual district court judges as if they are a Supreme Court of one deciding 
important issues for the whole nation with little briefing and little input from 
stakeholders. One means of correcting against that is to require district courts to gather 
information about the legal landscape in the first instance—for example, identifying 
other similar suits, taking into account nonparties who will be impacted if jurisdiction 
is exercised, and being in active dialogue with co-equal courts wrestling with the same 
or similar issues, among other things.    
Additionally, I believe that the solution should ultimately afford district courts 
some flexibility. Equity should not be so rigid as to be unable to meet novel problems 
head-on.233 District courts need to be able to pivot to address unique situations that 
bright-line rules might otherwise miss. At bottom, our solution should permit district 
courts to be responsive to evolving conditions, urgent needs, and new kinds of injuries.  
Lastly, the formalist fix—freezing our equity in time—is no fix at all. It elevates 
predictability above justice, is legally conservative, and otherwise antithetical to 
equity. 234 We can begin by telling the truth about what work history is and is not doing 
here. We can tell a different history of federal equity and, in doing so, accommodate 
our current concerns about its scope and our chancellors’ discretion.235 Where new 
remedies emerge, legitimacy can be earned by consent. The constitutional legitimacy 
of a class of equitable remedy does not necessarily turn on its lineage. If legitimacy is 
the true concern, trying to divine hard, ahistoric limits is the wrong approach. 
 
beginning; it’s that the government has seen the error of its ways, and should be let off the hook 
for its original sin.”). 
233 See Malveaux, supra note 16, at 56 (“Although national injunctions are imperfect and crude 
forms of justice, they are better than no justice at all—which for some actions, may be the 
alternative.”). 
234 Randolph Haines, The Conservative Assault on Federal Equity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 451, 
479–85 (2014). 
235 Cf.  Burbank, supra note 201, at 1346 (“In meeting the challenge of progress in a world that 
is in every respect more accessible than before, we cannot allow our traditions to hold us 
hostage. Neither can we afford to neglect them. Honoring our legal traditions sometimes 
requires a change in the rules to reflect the changed circumstances in which they operate. 
Honoring any legal tradition requires that claims of changed circumstances be filtered through 
an understanding of the reasons for the rules tradition bequeaths, both those that are formal and, 
to the extent implicated, those that reflect the social context in which the rules were born or 
nourished. It also requires that attention be given, in both dimensions, to traditional rules about 
who should decide.”). 
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B. The Proposal  
Given the aforementioned premises, it seems to me that the best solution is to turn 
to abstention. I submit that a prudential, discretionary kind of abstention, that can be 
invoked sua sponte or on the motion of any party or intervening movant with a real 
interest in the suit at any point after a complaint seeking a nationwide injunction is 
filed. Ideally, abstention will be  considered before or shortly after a party moves for 
a preliminary or permanent nationwide injunction.  
The abstention power is a narrow but important exception to the general rule that 
federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction 
given them.”236 The contours of the abstention power are well illuminated in 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance, where the Court explains the “authority of a 
federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in which 
the court has discretion to grant or deny relief,” clarifying that the “power to abstain” 
is located “in the historic discretion exercised by federal courts sitting in equity” but 
is not a “technical rule of equity procedure.”237  
Presently, the Supreme Court recognizes five discrete kinds of abstention in equity 
matters.238 Pullman abstention permits a federal court to stay a plaintiff’s claim that a 
state law violates the Constitution until the state’s judiciary has had an opportunity to 
apply the law to the plaintiff’s particular case.239 Younger abstention bars federal 
courts from hearing civil rights tort claims brought by a person currently being 
prosecuted for a matter arising from that claim in state court.240 Buford abstention 
allows a federal court sitting in diversity to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where 
state courts are likely to have greater expertise in a particularly complex area of state 
law.241 Thibodaux abstention allows a federal court sitting in diversity to allow a state 
to decide issues of state law that are of great public importance to the state where the 
federal court finds that exercising jurisdiction would infringe on state sovereignty.242 
And Colorado River abstention allows a federal court to abstain where there are 
 
236 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1976) (first 
citing England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); then citing 
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910); and then citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). 
237 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996). 
238 Five is an oversimplification. Maggie Gardner and others make a convincing case that the 
Court has approved of other kinds of abstention that are unique but are poorly defined. See, e.g., 
Maggie Gardner, Abstention at the Boarder, 105 VA. L. REV. 63 (2019) (critiquing international 
comity abstention). 
239 R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
240 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Though beyond the scope of my Article, I think it 
important to point out Fred O. Smith, Jr.’s inspired and timely article urging that the Supreme 
Court recognize an exception to Younger abstention when litigants challenge structural or 
systemic constitutional violations. Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 2284 (2018). 
241 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 339 (1943). 
242 La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
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parallel litigations in state and federal courts being carried out to determine the rights 
of parties with respect to the same issues of law.243 
My proposal is modeled in part off of Colorado River abstention. It is a prudential 
and discretionary doctrine. But there are some differences. One key difference is the 
abstention factors. The Colorado River factors are calibrated to inoculate against the 
problems raised by parallel litigations in state and federal courts carried out to 
determine the rights of parties with respect to the same issues of law.244 Courts weigh 
different factors, including but not limited to: the order in which the courts assumed 
jurisdiction over the property or parties;245 relative inconvenience of the fora;246 
relative progress of the two actions;247 desire to avoid piecemeal litigation;248 whether 
federal law provides the rule of decision;249 whether the state court will adequately 
 
243 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
244 See, e.g., R.R. St. & Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2011). 
245 See, e.g., Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2000). 
246 Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(characterizing factor as focusing “primarily on the physical proximity of the federal forum to 
the evidence and witnesses”); see also Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 
1141 (11th Cir. 2013) (where federal forum and state forum are “equally convenient,” this factor 
cuts against abstention); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regul. 
Dist., 673 F.3d 84, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (similar); Stewart v. W. Heritage Ins., 438 F.3d 488, 492 
(5th Cir. 2006) (similar); PainWebber, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 F.3d 197, 207 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(similar). 
247 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 21 (1983) 
(“[P]riority should not be measured exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather 
in terms of how much progress has been made in the two actions.”); Transouth Fin. Corp. v. 
Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his factor requires the court to consider not 
only the chronological order in which the parties initiated the concurrent proceedings, but the 
progress of the proceedings and whether the party availing itself of the federal forum should 
have acted earlier . . . .”). 
248 See, e.g., Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 1997) (“mere possibility of piecemeal 
litigation” does not justify Colorado River abstention; rather, there must be a strongly 
articulated congressional policy against piecemeal litigation in the specific context of the case 
under review”); Burns v. Walter, 931 F.2d 140, 146 (1st Cir. 1991) (concern for avoiding 
piecemeal adjudication is met only where it “gives rise to special complications” not present in 
straightforward state law negligence case). But see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Foremost-
McKesson, Inc., 751 F.2d 475, 477 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming stay of federal action under 
Colorado River, in favor of state court action, to avoid piecemeal litigation and the possibility 
of divergent interpretations of insurance policy language, and where state court action was filed 
first and involved all insurers as parties). 
249 See, e.g., Evanston Ins. Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The 
presence of a federal law issue ‘must always be a major consideration weighing against 
surrender [of jurisdiction],’ but the presence of state law issues weighs in favor of surrender 
only in rare circumstances.”) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26); Village of 
Westfield v. Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen the applicable substantive 
law is federal, abstention is disfavored.”); Noonan S., Inc. v. Cnty. of Volusia, 841 F.2d 380, 
383 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[F]act that both forums are adequate to protect the parties’ rights merely 
renders this factor neutral.”); Woodford v. Cmty. Action Agency of Greene Cnty., Inc., 239 
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protect the rights of all parties;250 and whether the federal filing was vexatious 
(intended to harass the other party) or reactive (in response to adverse rulings in the 
state court).251 Of course, nationwide injunctions raise similar but slightly different 
problems than those at issue in Colorado River abstention cases. For that reason, infra 
Section IV.C, I suggest seven disjunctive factors, several informed by the Colorado 
River factors, others unique to the nationwide injunction context.  
Another key difference is how courts should go about balancing the abstention 
factors. In Colorado River abstention, the factors must be heavily weighed in favor of 
the exercise of jurisdiction.252 The metrics used in Colorado River abstention are 
informed by two overarching interests: the rationalization that it makes little sense for 
two courts to expend the time and effort to achieve a resolution to a common 
question253 and sense that abstention is an appropriate means to promote regard for 
proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations.254 Because 
different interests inform my nationwide injunction abstention proposal, I suggest a 
different approach towards balancing infra Part IV.D. 
C. Factors 
Before discussing the factors individually, I will explain how the factors relate to 
one another and how district courts could go about gathering the information necessary 
to apply the factors. 
Under the proposal, the first four factors—whether nationwide injunctions have 
issued in similar cases (factor 1), whether there is a circuit split on a common core 
issue of law (factor 2), the representativeness of the parties (factor 3), whether there 
are suits involving at least two common parties and one common core issue of law 
(factor 4)—should always be considered by the district court. These factors are 
calibrated to guard against suppressing percolation of legal issues, guard against 
 
F.3d 517, 525 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Nor may abstention be based simply on an aversion to deciding 
an issue prior to a state court’s adjudication.”). 
250 See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk, 673 F.3d at 103. 
251 See, e.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(finding interest in preventing vexatiousness clearly justifies federal deferral to a parallel state 
proceeding unless there exists strong countervailing reasons for the federal court to decide the 
federal suit without further delay), noted with approval in Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 17 
n.20 (“[T]he vexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the state litigation may 
influence the decision whether to defer to a parallel state litigation under Colorado River . . . 
.”). 
252 See Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 16. 
253 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (noting 
that “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and 
comprehensive disposition of the litigation” favors abstention (citations omitted)). 
254 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 725 (1996) (alternatively characterizing 
abstention in Colorado River as being justified on premise that ‘exercise of federal review of 
the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a 
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern’ (quoting Colo. River, 424 
U.S. at 814–16)). 
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forum- and judge-shopping, and encourage horizontal comity between co-equal 
district courts with concomitant jurisdiction over similar cases. 
The remaining factors—whether the other suits were earlier filed (factor 5), the 
relative progress of the suits (factor 6), and whether the instant suit was reactively filed 
in response to adverse rulings in other suits (factor 7)—are only pertinent where the 
district court has found there are similar suits pursuant to the fourth factor. Factors 
five through seven are calibrated to promote comity between co-equal district courts 
with concomitant jurisdiction over the same or similar suits and guard against forum- 
and judge-shopping. They operate sort of like the first-filed rule, modified for the 
nationwide injunction context. To refresh, the first-filed rule is a judicial doctrine 
developed to address the problem of duplicative federal litigation. Under the rule, 
where there are successively filed federal suits in different district courts with 
concurrent jurisdiction, the court which has first possession of the subject must 
typically decide it.255 Courts generally apply the first-filed rule after evaluating three 
factors: (a) the chronology of events, (b) the similarity of the parties, and (c) the 
similarity of the issues or claims at stake.256 My proposal modifies the traditional first-
filed factors in a few important ways. For instance, while the fourth factor focuses on 
the commonality of parties, it does not require that all parties are similar—instead, it 
directs the district court to assess whether there are two common parties and at least 
one common core issue of law.257 This looser standard is a better fit for the nationwide 
injunction context given how the most problematic of these cases tend to be litigated—
large consortiums of states suing several federal actors and agencies simultaneously 
in different district courts.  
Insofar as factors five through seven are concerned, district courts will need to do 
considerable information gathering to get a grasp of the universe of potentially same 
or similar suits.258 This can likely be achieved in a few ways. One approach could be 
to direct the parties to the instant suit to disclose to the court all suits it is currently 
engaged in in federal court with the opposing parties and to make a representation to 
the court as to whether those suits involve at least one overlapping core common legal 
issue. These disclosures would include the case name, case number, date filed, short 
statement identifying the core legal issues of that case, and a brief description of the 
 
255 EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1988). 
256 Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1991). 
257 The Sixth Circuit has adopted a similar approach in other contexts. See Certified Restoration 
Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 551 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding the 
first-filed rule can be applied “when actions involving nearly identical parties and issues have 
been filed in two different district courts”).  
258 Amanda Frost has similarly suggested that district courts undertake significant information 
gathering before they issue a nationwide injunction. See Frost, supra note 1, at 1116 (“The best 
practice is for a federal district court to establish procedures to ensure that it has all the relevant 
information about the costs and benefits of the proposed scope of an injunction before issuing 
it. The court should hold a hearing at which the parties to the litigation, as well as interested 
third parties, can present evidence and make arguments about the proper scope of the remedy. 
The court should then issue a written ruling addressing the costs and benefits of an injunction 
in the case at hand that will provide a guide to the appellate courts, which may be asked to 
review the scope of the injunctive relief.” (citations omitted)). 
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current status of the case. This approach would require some labor on the part of the 
parties but is justified because they are in the best position to advise the district court 
of the universe of disputes. District courts would be free to scrutinize these disclosures 
and need not defer to parties’ representations that other cases are or are not dissimilar.  
With this foundation, we will explore each of the factors in further depth.  
1. Have Nationwide Injunctions Issued in Similar Cases 
This factor is calibrated to guard against the risk that a nationwide injunction will 
depress percolation of legal issues and otherwise encourages horizontal comity 
between co-equal district courts with concomitant jurisdiction over similar cases. For 
the purposes of this factor, a case is similar if there is at least one common core legal 
issue and it is more likely than not that if all the courts hearing similar cases were to 
grant the relief requested that the remedies would conflict. In most cases, this factor 
will lend some weight to support abstention.  
Ensuring that important legal issues can percolate in the lower courts is vitally 
important, as discussed supra Section II.C. Among other things, district courts 
reviewing this factor should take into account whether the common core issue of law 
is a matter of first impression in its own circuit and whether there is no circuit split on 
a core issue of law underlying the request for injunction. If the answer to either of 
those questions is yes, this is good evidence that the legal issue has not yet percolated, 
making it more likely than not that if an injunction is granted and later appealed that 
the reviewing court will have few if any other cases to draw upon to resolve the issue. 
Where there is an immediate need for a ruling on a novel issue of law, this may warrant 
exercising jurisdiction. However, less emergent disputes may partially support the 
decision to abstain. 
It is also imperative that we encourage comity between federal courts of equal 
rank.259 District courts are in a great position to do just that. Among other things, 
district courts reviewing this factor should assess whether sister districts have issued 
or declined nationwide injunctions in similar suits. Subsequent courts need not totally 
defer to the decisions of their co-equal sisters. However, they should assess whether 
“[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and 
comprehensive disposition of the litigation”260 favors abstention.  
This factor sometimes cuts the other way. For instance, if the same issues have 
been substantially litigated in other circuits then there is less worry that issuing a 
nationwide injunction will depress percolation. This is what happened in Pennsylvania 
v. President United States.261 There, the Department of Justice argued that a 
nationwide injunction should not have issued because it would depress percolation of 
the issue in other courts.262 The Third Circuit found that argument unavailing because 
 
259 Cf. Zide Sport Shop of Ohio v. Ed Tobergate Assocs., Inc., 16 Fed. App’x 433, 437 (6th 
Cir. 2007).   
260 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (quoting 
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 324 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). 
261 Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019). 
262 Id. at 576 n.34. 
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it identified several other cases where courts had considered “substantially the same 
legal issues as we confront here,” which it deemed as clear evidence of percolation.263  
2. Circuit Split over a Core Issue of Law  
This factor is calibrated to help guard against forum-shopping and also encourages 
horizontal comity between circuit courts with concomitant jurisdiction over cases with 
at least one common core legal issue. 
Critics of nationwide injunctions are legitimately worried that litigants will 
strategically file suit so as to secure a court or even a judge that will favor its legal 
position, as discussed supra Section II.C. The crux of the worry is that litigants will 
shop their case to the circuit that already has or is most likely to be convinced to rule 
on a core legal issue in the movant’s favor. This factor directs district courts gather 
information that may point to the fact that the case was forum- or even judge-shopped. 
This helps in two ways—it may lend considerable weight in favor of the district court 
abstaining or, in the event it does not abstain, the district court’s analysis can help the 
reviewing court assess the propriety of the district court’s decision to not abstain in 
light of the information the district court had at its disposal at the time of its decision.  
This factor also helps encourage comity among co-equal circuit courts. It does this 
in two ways. It flushes out forum-shopping, incentivizing litigants to not strategically 
deprive the appropriate fora of the case. And if the case is heard, it creates a record 
that can help the reviewing circuit take into account its sisters’ views on the common 
core legal issue. This is important because it affords an opportunity for conversation 
among the circuits. While district courts are bound by the law of their circuit, circuit 
courts may accommodate the views of its sisters on important legal issues.264  
3. Representativeness of Named Parties 
This factor is calibrated to guard against courts exercising jurisdiction over 
nationwide injunction suits that would inequitably infringe on the rights of nonparties. 
In that vein, it directs district courts to take into account the representativeness of the 
parities to the suit and, in certain circumstances, this may weigh heavily in favor of 
abstention. On the back end, it may help protect non-party interests by encouraging 
district courts to play a more proactive role in resolving representativeness problems. 
Given the breadth of nationwide injunctions, they all too often affect the rights of 
nonparties to the suit. This is not always problematic. For instance, sometimes 
nationwide injunctions are the best means to go about quickly protecting the rights of 
a diffusely constituted marginalized group, such as a subclass of immigrants scattered 
throughout the country.265 In cases like that, the universe of nonparties inevitably 
 
263 Id. 
264 For a superb discussion of this approach, see Wyatt G. Sassman, How Circuits Can Fix 
Their Splits, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 1401 (2020). 
265 I suggest accommodation, not total deference. See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 
177 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1900) (observing that “[c]omity is not a rule of law, but one of practice, 
convenience and expediency . . . the primary duty of every court is to dispose of cases according 
to the law and the facts; in a word, to decide them right.” Deference comes into play only where 
“there may be a doubt as to the soundness” of the judge’s views such that “a uniformity of a 
ruling to avoid confusion” is preferred “until a higher court has settled the law.”). 
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supports the relief sought because most could not bring suit themselves. In such a 
situation, representativeness—the fact that those nonparties’ interests are adequately 
represented by the parties themselves—is sufficient to sustain the breadth of the 
remedy and thus would not tilt in favor of abstention.  
However, in other cases the lack of representativeness harms nonparties. Too 
often, defenders of nationwide injunctions fail to account for how the 
unrepresentativeness of parties seeking nationwide injunction skews how the remedy 
is shaped, obfuscating the unique injuries of those affected by the injunction. There’s 
a special value in people who actually suffer an injury being able to have their day in 
court.266 Some defenders of the nationwide injunction urge that this is a de minimus 
problem. For instance, while Amanda Frost recognizes that “in some cases nonparties 
will not be able to bring their competing claims to court as a practical matter,” she 
suggests that any harm to nonparties is minimal because “nonparties can participate 
as amici in ongoing litigation, and their position may also be represented by 
government attorneys defending the law being enjoined.”267 But Frost misses the point 
that attorney general suits often fail to capture the true interests of real parties and 
amicus participation is woefully insufficient.  
It is true that states’ public law litigation, in particular where it challenges federal 
overstepping, plays an important role in the “ongoing debate over the proper scope 
and contours of federal and public law litigation.”268 However, the main reason why 
states bring so many suits is because they have an advantage proving their standing.269 
 
266 See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Tribes, Cities, and Children: Emerging Voices in 
Environmental Litigation, 34 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 237 (2019) (discussing value of tribes, 
cities, and youth in taking environmental claims to court; people who directly suffer the injury 
should be able to have day in court, might not have other options to address threats, their views 
might not be represented by state and federal government actors, etc.); Alexandra D. Lahav, 
The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3193 (2013) (arguing 
litigation can promote desirable ends such as citizen empowerment and deliberation; also 
arguing group litigation can provide a safety valve for the executive and legislature). 
267 Frost, supra note 1, at 1110. 
268 Raymond H. Brescia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of State 
Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. 363, 435 (2018). 
269 The standing doctrine revolution has seriously limited the ability of private citizens to bring 
public law litigation. Prior to the 1970s, the Supreme Court’s standing analysis was typified by 
“flexible and decidedly sub-constitutional standards.” Myriam E. Gilles, Representational 
Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 
318 (2001). But see Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing 
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004) (arguing that federal courts have long sought to 
maintain distinctions between proper litigants of public and private rights).  From the 1970s 
onward, the Court has grounded standing rules in Article III of the Constitution, promulgating 
rules and multi-pronged tests designed to evaluate plaintiffs’ standing to sue in light of 
separation of powers interests supposedly embodied in Article III’s “case or controversy” 
requirement. Gilles, supra, at 317. But see Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 459 (2008) (arguing contemporary standing doctrine does poor job of redressing 
separation of powers problems Court claims justify doctrine). 
But states have fared better. There are two reasons for this.  First, the Supreme Court holds 
states to a different standard than private citizens in public law litigation. In Massachusetts v. 
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The states have no particular acumen in forefronting the interests of interested 
nonparties. In fact, the states’ suits have a tendency of obscuring the landscape of 
interests at stake and elevating interests that should not be prioritized by the courts. 
As Raymond Brescia explains in the context of the Muslim Travel Ban litigations:  
The stories that states tell are very different from those of individual plaintiffs. 
Compare the alleged injuries of the states of Hawai’i, Washington, Minnesota, i.e., 
that their universities’ students will not be able to travel and their universities’ 
educational mission will be harmed, to those of an individual stopped at a U.S. airport 
who risked his life serving as an interpreter in Iraq for U.S. ground troops. Which is 
more salient, which calls out for judicial intervention, and which places the alleged 
illegal activity in higher relief?270  
Thus, though states are getting past standing hurdles in nationwide injunction suits, 
they are not bringing vehicles that speak to the broad range of interests at stake. 
Relegating impacted nonparties to amicus status is a similarly dubious suggestion. 
There are three key reasons why amicus status is a woefully insufficient means to 
protect and preserve third party interests in nationwide injunction cases. First and 
foremost, where a third party finds herself at risk of being bound by a nationwide 
injunction but not a party to the suit, amicus curiae status alone is not enough to allow 
her to preserve her interests. The reason for this is somewhat obvious—amicus 
participation is by design quite limited. American federal courts have historically been 
hostile towards third party participation in litigation.271 Amicus practice, as we 
received and refined it from the English tradition,272 is no replacement for full party 
participation and was never intended to be one. Rather, amici may appear and 
participate in proceedings only by negotiation with the core parties and are often 
further limited by the court. While such limits are sensible where third parties are 
 
EPA, the Court famously instructed that states be afforded “special solicitude” in standing 
inquiries. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). That special status has been invoked 
by lower federal courts repeatedly as justifying less-than searching standing inquiries where 
states sue the federal government. Second, states have shifted their strategy in public law 
litigation to get around barriers to standing, increasingly deploying a private law model of 
litigation to advance public law interests. 
270 Brescia, supra note 268, at 435. 
271 Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 
(1963) (describing evolution under American law). 
272 See, e.g., Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin 
After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1244 (1992) (tracing origins of amicus curiae 
practice to 14th century and Roman law; traditionally, amicus curiae was not a party to the 
litigation, but served as an impartial assistant to the judiciary, providing advice and information 
to a mistake or doubtful court); Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American 
Courts and Their Friends, 1790–1890, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 111, 122 (2003) (arguing study 
of early amici participants reveals that transitioned from historic mix of neutral and partisanship 
in roughly equal measure to mixture dominated by partisanship; change that was “most likely 
driven by changing nature of litigation rather than by any change in partisanship of lawyers 
themselves”); Dan Scweitzer, The Modern History of State Attorneys Arguing as Amici Curiae 
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 22 GREEN BAG 143 (2019) (describing evolution of state amici curiae 
practice). 
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disinterested expert observers or advocates of causes,273 they make no sense where a 
third party’s own rights are at stake. Second, amicus status may not even be a practical 
avenue for a wide array of third parties with stakes in the outcome of a case. The 
average person can no longer serve as an amicus. The amici bar is almost entirely 
made up of monied organizations, advocates, and wealthy private actors who can 
afford to fund briefs, lawyers, and trade in influence and prestige. Third, even if a third 
party harnesses the resources to appear as an amicus, the extent of her participation 
will be limited. Whether, when, and to what extent amici participate in proceedings is 
negotiated between the core courts and amici and ultimately subject to curtailment by 
the court. Moreover, even if a third party can appear, she will likely be drowned out 
by non-profits and others who control the field.274 
Given the foregoing, under this factor, district courts should assess whether the 
parties sufficiently represent the universe of important interests at stake. This can be 
done by searchingly assessing whether the named parties’ interests are representative 
of the universe of interests that will be affected by the nationwide injunction sought. 
That search should keep in mind that, more often than not, nonparties’ interests are 
not only unrepresented by the parties but also not effectively or (sometimes, at all) 
raised by amici.275 The analysis should be informed by traditional equitable regard for 
the rights of nonparties. In that vein, district courts should take care to ensure that, 
where possible, they not only take jurisdiction in cases where it is more likely than not 
that the disposition will negatively impinge the rights of nonparties.276 Where the 
movant claims she is seeking to vindicate the rights of a large but poorly defined group 
of persons, this may weigh in favor of abstention if the court cannot reasonably discern 
a common set of facts shared by the group that justifies the ultimate relief sought.277  
 
273 See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FL. STATE U. L. REV. 
315 (2008) (arguing amicus briefs are an important part of deliberative democracy, a theory that 
favors fully informed debate as a condition to a democratic society); Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al., 
Me Too? An Investigation of Repetition in U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Briefs, 97 
JUDICATURE 228, 228–29 (2014) (observing that literature reflects that amicus briefs influence 
judicial behavior; at Supreme Court briefs affect certiorari decisions, litigation success, 
ideological direction of the Court’s decisions and justices’ votes, frequency of separate opinion 
writing, and content of the Court’s opinions).   
274 Michael J. Harris, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship in American 
Jurisprudence, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1 (2000) (arguing private party amicus 
curiae are inappropriate because they are inconsistent with established legal doctrine— they 
neither further policy goals nor a philanthropic agenda). 
275 See discussion supra Part II. 
276 Cf. Joy v. Wirtz, 13 F. Cas. 1172, 1174 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (explaining that courts should 
“take care to make no decree” that would affect the rights of nonparties). 
277 Cf. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 115 (1897) (“The theory of the decree is that the plaintiff 
is one of a class of persons whose rights are infringed and threatened, and that he so represents 
such class that he may pray an injunction on behalf of all persons that constitute it. It is, indeed, 
possible that there may be others in like case with the plaintiff, and that such persons may be 
numerous, but such a state of facts is too conjectural to furnish a safe basis upon which a court 
of equity ought to grant an injunction.”). 
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It is possible that district courts might also use this factor to play a more proactive 
role in guiding nationwide injunction suits. For instance, if a suit has a clear 
representativeness problem, but equities otherwise weigh in favor of it proceeding, the 
district court would be justified in taking affirmative steps to help cure the 
representativeness problem.278 Judges could, after making a finding of deficient 
representativeness, put out a notice to those whose rights are at stake and create a 
“contest to the fullness and adequacy of the representation” or simply invite litigating 
amicus to the suit.279 Expanding the “who” of the litigation in this way may very well 
help quell concerns about the legitimacy of a very broad injunction.280 
4. Commonality of Parties to Earlier Filed, Live Suits  
This factor directs the district court to assess whether the case before it is the same 
or similar to other cases currently being litigated before co-equal district courts. For 
the purposes of this factor, a case is the same or similar where there are at least two 
common parties, at least one common core legal issue, and it is more likely than not 
that if all the courts hearing similar cases were to grant the relief requested that the 
remedies would conflict.  
This factor is related to the first factor insofar as both direct the district court to 
take into account similar cases being heard by co-equal district courts. However, 
factors one and four pick up on different kinds of comity problems. The first factor 
targets what might be termed as moderate comity problems—cases that raise the same 
legal issue and that, down the line, might lead to conflicts between the courts. The 
fourth factor targets a more pernicious problem—cases where a common set of parties 
attempts to litigate the same common core legal issue in two or more courts 
simultaneously.  
In the event that there are other suits involving some subset of the same parties and 
a common core legal issue, the district court should move on and assess the fifth factor, 
and so on. If the district court determines that there are no similar suits, it technically 
need not assess factors five, six, or seven, all of which are calibrated to assess potential 
problems that erupt where there are similar cases.  
5. Order in Which Jurisdiction Was Assumed over the Parties 
This factor directs the district court to take account of the order in which the same 
or similar suits, as found in factor four, were filed in other co-equal district courts. A 
finding that there are one or more earlier filed same or similar suits may weigh heavily 
in favor of abstention. There are a few reasons for this. First, it is well-settled that 
district courts lack the authority to hear later filed suits that seek to preempt 
substantially developed merits litigations in other federal fora let alone grant the relief 
 
278 Fiss, supra note 199, at 26 (suggesting the same in the context of structural injunctions). 
279 Id. 
280 Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and 
They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 366 (2018) (arguing that the 
scope of injunction is permissibly broadened by expanding the scope of the litigation itself—
one way to do this is to allow greater third-party participation—class actions, associational 
standing, third-party standing, etc.). 
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sought therein.281 Second, where possible, district courts should take reasonable steps 
to avoid the multiplicity and circuity of actions.282 Third, and relatedly, district courts 
should not countenance litigants’ attempts to use nationwide injunction suits as an 
instrument of procedural fencing either to secure delay or choose a forum.283  
6. Relative Progress of the Suits 
This factor directs district courts to assess whether exercising jurisdiction would 
needlessly encroach on the jurisdiction of sister courts. It ostensibly directs district 
courts to employ a kind of preclusion-light to avoid comity problems. Under this 
factor, district courts should searchingly assess the status of the same or similar cases 
uncovered in factor four. Among other things, the court should take account of 
whether there are motions pending or rulings of law on common core legal issues.  
Where there are motions pending on common core legal issues before a sister 
court, this may weigh in favor of abstention in light of the interest in encouraging 
sound judicial administration and comity among federal courts.284 If there is 
sufficiently mature motion practice before a sister court, even if still pending, 
abstention may be appropriate. Different interests are at play here, including 
preservation of judicial resources, respect for other courts’ decisions about how best 
to structure their proceedings, and avoiding waste of party resources.  
If there are rulings of law on common core legal issues, this should weigh in favor 
of abstention. There are a few reasons for this, very similar to those supporting 
application of res judicata and claim preclusion.285 Among others, society has an 
 
281 See, e.g., Gregory-Portland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 576 F.2d 81, 82–83 
(5th Cir. 1978) (directing second district court to transfer case back to first district court which 
still had jurisdiction over the parties); W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Loc. 24, 751 F.2d 
721, 731 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the second district court’s issuance of preliminary 
injunction in a purported effort to “preserve the status quo” intruded on the decisional authority 
of the first district court which still had jurisdiction over the parties); see also Ceres Gulf v. 
Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court’s denial of intervention motion 
and directing the court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction). 
282 Cf. Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661, 670 (E.D. Tex. 1968), aff’d, 410 F.2d 210 
(5th Cir. 1969) (noting import of avoiding “multiplicity and circuity of actions” in declaratory 
judgment context). 
283 Cf. Mission Ins. v. Puritan Fashions, 706 F.2d 599, 602 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that the 
“wholesome purposes of declaratory acts would be aborted by its use as an instrument of 
procedural fencing either to secure delay or to choose a forum”). 
284 EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1988). 
285 Res judicata is a doctrine that bar claims that have been litigated or that could have been 
litigated from being relitigated. A related doctrine, collateral estoppel, bars issues that have been 
litigated from being relitigated. Whereas “res judicata operates only when there has been a prior 
judgment on the merits,” collateral estoppel has “more limited preclusive effect,” barring only 
re-litigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to holdings in the prior litigation. Keene 
Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 1340, 1346 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d sub nom. GAF Corp. v. 
United States, 818 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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interest in a stable judicial system, one hallmark of which is that once determinations 
about legal relations are set, they remain fixed.286  
As far as rulings of law are concerned, district courts should employ a kind of 
preclusion-light approach to avoid comity problems. By this, I mean that assessing the 
relative progress of the same or similar cases entails looking at not just the date the 
cases were filed or judgments entered, but, in some instances, will extend to looking 
at decisions of law at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stage, even if those 
decisions would for the purposes of appeal be deemed interlocutory.  
There are two good reasons for that approach in the nationwide injunction context. 
First, where a coequal court has already reached a decision on the merits, even in an 
interlocutory order, respect for the orderly administration of the federal judicial system 
requires that its decision not be disturbed by a nationwide injunction issued by another 
coequal court. That is because it is for the court of first instance to determine the 
threshold legal question “and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, 
either by itself or a high court, its order based on its decision is to be respected.”287 As 
Justice Kennedy explained decades ago, “[w]hen an injunction sought in one federal 
proceeding would interfere with another federal proceeding, considerations of comity 
require more than the usual measure of restraint, and such injunctions should be 
granted only in the most unusual cases.”288 
Second, where there is some mutuality of parties, it is even more important that 
courts give prior adjudications settling issues of law, such as issues of statutory 
interpretation, even at preliminary stages like the motion to dismiss stage, preclusive 
effect. While interlocutory orders issued by the first court may not be final in the sense 
that they may be reconsidered by the first court or appealed later, they should not be 
open to collateral attack in other fora.289 If the rule were otherwise, we would 
perversely incentivize well-resourced parties to file successive overlapping suits to 
relitigate key threshold questions of law, undermining the important policy that 




286 Cf. Kevin M. Clermont, Limiting the Last-in-Time Rule for Judgments, 36 REV. LIT. 1, 2 
(2017) (making similar point to explain res judicata’s import). 
287 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Walker v. 
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967)). 
288 Bergh v. Washington, 535 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J.).  
289 United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 171 (1984) (“In such a case, it is unfair 
to the winning party and an unnecessary burden on the courts to allow repeated litigation of the 
same issue in what is essentially the same controversy, even if the issue is regarded one of 
‘law’.”). 
290 James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 463 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[T]here 
will always [be] a lingering question whether the party might have succeeded in proving his 
point if he had only been given a second chance . . . . Without more, however, this question is 
not sufficient to outweigh the extremely important policy underlying the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel – that litigation of issues at some point must come to an end.”). 
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7. Was Filing of Subsequent Suit Reactive 
This factor directs district courts to assess whether the instant suit was filed 
reactively in response to one or more earlier filed or more mature cases. It aims to 
inoculate against litigants using nationwide injunction suits to procedurally fence or 
relitigate an issue of law.  
Under this factor, district courts should searchingly assess whether there is 
evidence of reactivity. Among other things, courts may consider whether the instant 
suit was filed after a same or similar case was filed, an adverse judgment on a common 
or core issue of law was briefed or actually decided, a preliminary or permanent 
injunction premised on a common core issue of law was entered, or final judgment 
was entered.  
If there is evidence of reactivity, this factor weighs strongly in favor of abstention. 
A few interests and well-settled rules of adjudication support this. This kind of 
balancing aligns with the rule that district courts lack the discretion to hear cases 
within their jurisdiction where the claims seek relief from a judgment entered by a 
coordinate court, when the parties can seek redress in the issuing court.291 Similarly, 
equities and principles of judicial economy weigh heavily in favor of disallowing re-
litigation of threshold issues of law already decided in an earlier filed, still pending 
suit from being relitigated in a later filed suit.292 Evidence of reactivity also supports 
abstention given the strong interest in ensuring litigants have a single determination 
of their controversy, rather than several decisions which, if they conflict, may require 
separate appeals to different circuit courts of appeals.293 Indeed, abstention may, in 
some reactive suits, be the only true means of protecting the parties and courts from 
the possibility of conflicting orders and injunctions.294 
Some circuits have already adopted a version of this factor. For instance, in United 
States v. AMC Entertainment, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its 
discretion in issuing a nationwide injunction against AMC because it was 
 
291 Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 728 (4th Cir. 1986); Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169, 
172 (9th Cir. 1964) (declining relief to party to original action who sought relief from coordinate 
rather than original court); Mann Mfg., Inc. v. Hortex, Inc., 439 F.2d 403, 408 n.5 (5th Cir. 
1971) (quoting Lapin); Treadaway v. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis., 783 F.2d 1418, 
1421 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Carter v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 782 F.2d 138, 142 n.4 (10th Cir. 
1986) (same); see also Goins v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 657 F.2d 62, 64 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(applying Lapin principle in case where plaintiff in second action was neither party nor the 
successor-in-interest of party in first action); Brittingham v. Commissioner, 451 F.2d 315, 316–
17 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); Exxon Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 594 F. Supp. 84, 89–90 (D. 
Del. 1984) (same); Common Cause v. Jud. Ethics Comm., 473 F. Supp. 1251, 1253 (D.D.C. 
1979) (same). 
292 See, e.g., Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1521 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Blonder-
Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971)) (“The requirement that 
the party against whom the prior judgment is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to be heard 
centers on the fundamental fairness of preventing the party from relitigating an issue [she] has 
lost in a prior proceeding.”). 
293 Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 796 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Crosley Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941)). 
294 See, e.g., EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 977 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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geographically inappropriate in light of it covering areas in the Fifth Circuit, which 
had already spoken on the issue of law at the heart of the injunction adversely.295 The 
Ninth Circuit went on to explain that courts in the Ninth Circuit should not “grant 
relief that would cause substantial interference with the established judicial 
pronouncements of such sister circuits. To hold otherwise would create tension 
between circuits and would encourage forum shopping.”296 
D. Balancing Considerations 
There are a handful of other hard rules that should govern the balancing process.  
First and foremost, district courts must take care to consider the abstention factors 
and reach a carefully considered judgment in writing explaining their reasons for 
electing or declining to abstain.297 If the district court does not take into account the 
abstention factors and reduce its rationales to writing, it has abused its discretion.298 
Similarly, it is an abuse of discretion for the district court to not gather the necessary 
information from the parties on which to assess the abstention factors. 
Second, the balance should heavily weigh against exercise of jurisdiction. Several 
reasons support this calibration. Where there are serious concerns about the propriety 
of court intervention, district courts should decline their equitable jurisdiction.299 
Additionally, because all injunctions are regarded as extraordinary remedies, the 
default assumption should be that relief is not warranted.300 Because nationwide 
injunctions, given their breadth, are even more extraordinary the balancing mechanism 
should be calibrated to avoid exercise of jurisdiction that could give fruit to a 
nationwide injunction. 
 
295 United States v. AMC Ent., Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 770–73 (9th Cir. 2008).   
296 Id.  
297 Cf. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1976) 
(“[A] carefully considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise 
jurisdiction and the combination of factors counseling against that exercise is required.”). 
298 The Fifth Circuit has adopted a similar rule in the declaratory judgment context. See 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted) (“[U]nless the district court addresses and balances the purposes of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act and the factors relevant to the abstention doctrine on the record, it abuses its 
discretion.”). 
299 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971) (explaining that abstention is premised 
on the “basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act” in particular 
situations); see also Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 805, 807 (1869) 
(noting that equitable jurisdiction should be exercised in a manner that “protect[s] all rights and 
do[es] justice to all concerned”). 
300 See, e.g., Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg., Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337–38 (1933) (the 
injunction “is not a remedy which issues as of course”); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 
440 (1944) (“The award of an interlocutory injunction by courts of equity has never been 
regarded as strictly a matter of right, even though irreparable injury may otherwise result to the 
plaintiff”); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (“[A] federal judge sitting 
as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law.”). 
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 Third, the balancing factors should not be applied mechanically. Nationwide 
injunctions create complicated problems for coordinate courts. As the Supreme Court 
has recognized in other contexts where comity issues are at the fore, “[w]ise judicial 
administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive 
disposition of litigation, does not counsel rigid mechanical solution of such problems. 
The factors relevant to wise administration here are equitable in nature. Necessarily, 
an ample degree of discretion, appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges, 
must be left to the lower courts.”301 Courts should thus not treat any single factor as a 
“mandate directing wooden application of the rule without regard to rare or 
extraordinary circumstances, inequitable conduct, bad faith, or forum shopping. 
District courts have always had discretion to retain jurisdiction given appropriate 
circumstances.”302 
Beyond those hard rules, district courts should be afforded flexibility in balancing 
the factors in light of the particular interests that predominate in the case.303 In some 
cases, representativeness problems (factor three) may be so strong that, in combination 
with weaker showings under other factors, abstention is necessary, at least until the 
representativeness problem is resolved. In other cases, the reactivity of the suit (factor 
seven) may predominate.  
Where the district court determines that abstention is necessary, it should be 
afforded considerable flexibility in deciding the parameters of its abstention. A few 
options are available. It can totally decline to consider the request for a nationwide 
injunction but retain jurisdiction over the case. Alternatively, it can delay considering 
the request for a nationwide injunction until another court with priority acts first. Or, 
in exceptional circumstances, the district court may dismiss the case outright.  
E. Benefits of an Abstention Approach 
There are several benefits to an abstention approach to nationwide injunctions. 
One key strength of abstention is that it facilitates early intervention. Many of the 
most pressing problems nationwide injunctions sow arise when a district court 
exercises jurisdiction in the first instance, long before any remedy is awarded. 
Abstention is ordered around that exact problem—it offers rough rules to manage 
traffic as cases and claims pile up and allows district courts to pause or entirely duck 
out of the dispute as necessary.  
Another strength of abstention is its flexibility. The proposal directs district courts 
to take a wholistic account of what is at stake, who is involved, and what relief is 
sought in light of the case before it and the universe of other similar or overlapping 
cases. There are few rules, and thus little incentive for district courts to try to hide 
 
301 Kerotest Mfg., Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip., Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183–84 (1952). 
302 EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1988). 
303 Cf. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (holding 
in context of Colorado River abstention that “[t]he weight to be given to any one factor may 
vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular setting of the case”).   
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what they are actually doing,304 which should increase public confidence in the 
nationwide injunctions that do issue.  
The proposal also has practical value—it directs district courts to create a detailed 
record that is designed to flush out nationwide injunction problems. This ensures a 
record of district court’s considerations that an appellate court can review, facilitating 
better assessment of whether the district court should have exercised jurisdiction and 
as well as the merits of granting (or withholding) the remedy.  
An additional benefit is that an abstention approach is responsive to, but does not 
overcorrect for, the legitimacy problems imprudently granted nationwide injunctions 
lay bare. Nationwide injunctions are constitutional,305 but the debate about their 
propriety has placed considerable pressure on the judiciary to make a constitutional 
account of their Article III powers.306 Judicial independence is fragile, politically 
constructed, and historically contingent.307 The judiciary thus has an incentive to guard 
against the isolated problems and abuses nationwide injunctions can sow308 in-house 
given increased pressures on judicial independence. As Owen Fiss explains in context 
of structural injunctions, it is better for the courts to tame remedies and inoculate 
against abuses.309 This helps not only reassure the public of the remedy’s legitimacy, 
but also helps the judiciary shore up its institutional legitimacy in the process. 
Some other proposed solutions misdiagnose when and why nationwide injunctions 
prove problematic. For instance, some commentators, citing isolated abuses, urge 
nationwide injunctions be categorically barred.310 This is an overcorrection. Not all 
nationwide injunctions have proved problematic.  
Similarly flawed, some commentators suggest that the true problem with 
nationwide injunctions is that they overly burden nonparties. Matthew Erickson’s 
proposal falls in this camp.311 He suggests that courts adopt a three-factor test that 
takes into account “who” benefits from injunctions sought and if there are a large 
 
304 Cf. Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911 (2018) 
(arguing it would be better for the Supreme Court to stop claiming it is strictly abiding by legal 
formalism when it is plain that realist considerations influence their rulings). 
305 See discussion supra Part III. 
306 See discussion supra Part II. 
307 See generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 465 (2018). 
308 See discussion supra Section II.C. 
309 Fiss, supra note 199, at 37 (“Consent can also be earned. But that takes time and thus 
structural reform should be given a chance to operate—a so-called trial run (assuming the past 
decade has not been sufficient). If it survives, it will then be given the same claim to legitimacy 
as the so-called traditional model: the institution will have legitimated itself.”). 
310 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 9, at 469. 
311 Matthew Erickson, Who, What, Where: A Case for a Multifactor Balancing Test as a 
Solution to Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 334–35 (2018).  
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number of nonparty beneficiaries, a nationwide injunction is improper.312 This is also 
an overcorrection. Injunctions that benefit a large number of nonparties are not 
necessarily problematic. 
Also misguided are commentators whose proposed solutions presume that the 
scope of the remedy is the true problem and, based on that misdiagnosis, suggest that 
we recalibrate the injunction factors. As one example, Zayn Siddique proposes that 
we modify the injunction factors to codify the “complete relief” principle as a formal 
limit on the appropriate geographic scope of an injunction.313 The proposal is premised 
on the assumption that complete relief is a descriptively useful principle to categorize 
the types of cases where nationwide injunctions tend to issue and that it could thus 
function as a limiting principle. However, complete relief seems to be both a 
misleading and incomplete standard. Complete relief does not seem to have a limiting 
effect on the scope of injunctions where focus is not limited to an action’s effect solely 
on parties before the court. As Ronald Cass argues, where political judgments are 
“integrally related to the assessment of interests involved on both sides (for and against 
the injunction), the standard of complete relief tilts remedies toward the political 
forces opposing the government.”314 Cass also cautions that the inherent bias of the 
complete relief standard can also exaggerate the bias baked into nationwide injunction 
suits given the fact that the side seeking the injunction is likely to have forum-shopped 
into a court it knows is likely to favor broader relief in the first instance—it thus leads 
to a situation where there’s both an easier venue for the moving party and easier 
standard for relief if that party prevails.315 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit pointed to this 
problem in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, there reversing a nationwide 
injunction on the logic that if “complete relief” were given too much weight, then “a 
nationwide injunction would result any time an enjoined action has potential 
nationwide effects. Such an approach would turn broad injunctions into the rule rather 
than the exception.”316 
Some other proposals miss the mark because they urge that courts rigidly classify 
nationwide injunction suits by type and apply different rules to each kind of suit. 
Michael Morely’s proposal is one such example.317 He suggests that we break 
nationwide injunction suits into five discrete classes—plaintiff-oriented injunctions, 
plaintiff-class injunctions, associational injunctions, defendant-oriented injunctions, 
and defendant-class injunctions—and argues a different judicial approach is due to 
 
312 Id. at 361 (arguing that courts should adopt a three-factor test that takes into account “who” 
benefits from injunction sought and if there are a large number of nonparty beneficiaries a 
nationwide injunction is improper). 
313 Siddique, supra note 15, at 2139–47 (suggesting an amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 that 
would codify the “complete relief principle”). 
314 Ronald A. Cass, Nationwide Injunctions’ Governance Problems: Forum Shopping, 
Politicizing Courts, and Eroding Constitutional Structure, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. 29, 62 
(2019). 
315 Id. at 63.  
316 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). 
317 Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2020). 
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each.318 But proposals like Morley’s miss the mark because they conflict with the 
Court’s recent equity precedents that abhor applying dispositive presumptions crafted 
to deal with sub-classes of cases.319  
Other proposed solutions suffer from being unrealistic to implement under current 
conditions. One example is Judge Gregg Costa’s proposal, which suggests that 
Congress pass legislation creating three-judge panels to hear nationwide injunction 
suits and make those decisions immediately appealable to the Supreme Court.320 
Similarly unrealistic is Zachary Clopton’s proposal.321 He suggests that the problems 
nationwide injunctions pose for nonparties can be solved if traditional preclusion 
principles are applied with the hefty caveat that this would require the Supreme Court 
to modify or overrule United States v. Mendoza,322 which held that the federal 
government is exempt from offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel, an exceedingly 
unlikely proposition.323 
F. Objections 
Against this proposal at least three objections can be raised: one about 
constitutionality, one about supposed limits on abstention violated by the proposal, 
and one about whether it is appropriate for the Court to act or wait on Congress. Here, 
I briefly explore each objection. 
1. Abstention is Unconstitutional  
The concern that abstention is categorically improper has been floated in the 
literature for some time. The primary charge is that abstention is unconstitutional.324 
Proponents urge that federal courts must exercise the jurisdiction given to them by 
 
318 Id. at 9–10. 
319 See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
320 Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. L. REV. BLOG 
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-the-nationwide-
injunction-problem/ [https://perma.cc/TP94-2XQL]. 
321 Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
322 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
323 Clopton, supra note 321, at 5.  
324 The best critique of abstention is Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the 
Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 72, 76, 82, 88, 114–15 (1984). For more on 
the enduring legacy of Redish’s critique see generally William P. Marshall, Abstention, 
Separation of Powers, and Recasting the Meaning of Judicial Restraint, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
881, 883, 892, 896–98 (2013) (suggesting that Redish’s critique has “changed the way that the 
meaning of judicial restraint was conceptualized”); see also Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too 
Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99, 156 (1986) (“[A]bstention for reasons 
of wise judicial administration—is properly construed only as an unprincipled judicial self-help 
remedy. It is judicial activism of the most blatant kind: a cynical disregard for clearly expressed 
congressional intent that the federal courts exercise jurisdiction under circumstances that are 
statutorily defined.”). 
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Congress. That requirement, they reason, is baked into Article III, which gives 
Congress the exclusive power to create and set the jurisdiction of inferior federal 
courts.325 Because Congress alone sets jurisdiction, they urge that refusing to exercise 
it to its fullest extent is tantamount to a “usurpation” of Congress’s authority.326 Often, 
they point to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cohen v. Virginia for support. There, 
Marshall opined that federal courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other 
would be treason to the Constitution.”327 
I do not think that the constitutional objection to abstention is insurmountable. 
After Cohen, the Court has repeatedly recognized that “[t]he proposition that a court 
having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true.”328 When sitting in equity, 
federal courts exercise jurisdiction subject to the ancient principles of equity which 
inhere the “historic discretion” to abstain.329 The “power to abstain” is thus understood 
to be baked into the grant of equitable jurisdiction.330 This is an “extraordinary and 
narrow exception” to the rule that courts must typically exercise their full 
jurisdiction.331 It is, as David Shapiro argues, a proper exercise of the judicial power 
because “notions of reasoned judicial discretion are embodied in the very concept of 
jurisdiction.”332  
2. No Federal-Federal Abstention Doctrines  
Some might oppose the proposal on the pretense that abstention can only be 
justified in rare circumstances where federalism concerns outweigh the imperative that 
federal courts exercise the jurisdiction granted them by Congress. But there is no 
 
325 See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2018) (reaffirming that Congress’s control of 
federal courts’ jurisdiction is an essential component of separation of powers). 
326 Redish, supra note 324, at 71, 72, 76, 82, 88, 114–15. 
327 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). 
328 Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422 (1932). 
329 Id.; see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 
(1989) (clarifying that there are some classes of cases where abstaining is the “normal thing to 
do,” but that while abstention is permissible, it remains “the exception, not the rule”). 
330 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) (recognizing that the “power 
to abstain” is located “in the historic discretion exercised by federal courts ‘sitting in equity’”) 
(citation omitted). 
331 Allegheny Cnty. v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959) (“The doctrine of 
abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its 
jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to 
adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be 
justified under this doctrine only in exceptional circumstances.”). 
332 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 543 (1985); see also 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on the Distinction Between 
“Legitimate” and “Illegitimate” Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Lawmaking, 107 NW. U. 
L. REV. 847 (2013) (arguing that abstention can be justified under both textualist and purposivist 
theories of statutory interpretation). 
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Supreme Court precedent that sustains this argument. Rather, it is a rule wrongly 
inferred from the handful of twentieth century cases where the Court identified 
discrete instances in which abstention was appropriate. In each of those cases—
Pullman,333 Younger,334 Buford,335 and Thibodaux336—the Court justified abstention 
on federalism grounds.337 Even though the Court has never explicitly articulated 
principles to guide abstention where there is concurrent federal jurisdiction, that’s no 
bar.  
While state-federal conflicts are key features of most Supreme Court abstention 
cases to date, there is good reason to believe the abstention power can be exercised in 
other contexts. Principally, the kinds of abstention already recognized by the Court 
fall within the ancient power but are not exhaustive. Indeed, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 
Inc., the Court clarifies that “[t]he various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes 
into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex of 
considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that contemplates 
parallel judicial processes.”338 In fact, the Court has long recognized that district courts 
are empowered to invoke abstention in equity matters even if there is “no precise rule” 
 
333 R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941) (“Few public interests 
have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless 
friction with state policies, whether the policy relates to the enforcement of criminal law, or the 
administration of a specialized scheme for liquidating embarrassed business enterprises, or the 
final authority of a state court to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state. These cases 
reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts, 
‘exercising a wise discretion’, restrain their authority because of ‘scrupulous regard for the 
rightful independence of the state governments’ and for the smooth working of the federal 
judiciary.” (citations omitted)). 
334 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“This underlying reason for restraining courts 
of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital 
consideration, the notion of ‘comity’, that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition 
of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a 
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their 
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”). 
335 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1943) (“Although a federal equity court 
does have jurisdiction of a particular proceeding, it may, in its sound discretion, whether its 
jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of diversity of citizenship or otherwise, ‘refuse to enforce 
or protect legal rights, the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest’; for it ‘is 
in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with 
proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out their domestic 
policy.’” (citations omitted)). 
336 La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (“The justification for 
this power, to be exercised within indicated limits, lies in regard for the respective competence 
of the state and the federal court systems and for the maintenance of harmonious federal-state 
relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State.”). 
337 See Gardner, supra note 238, at 74 (characterizing mid-twentieth century abstention 
doctrines as devised “primarily to protect state interests from federal encroachment”). 
338 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987). 
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that applies.339 The Court has also recognized in dicta that abstention may be 
appropriate where there is concurrent federal jurisdiction. For instance, in Colorado 
River the Court acknowledges that “there are principles unrelated to considerations of 
proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations which govern 
in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, 
either by federal courts or by state and federal courts.”340 The Court goes on to 
recognize that federal district courts had for some time abstained in the context of 
federal-federal conflicts.341 
Beyond that, it is unproblematic for district courts to exercise their discretion to 
abstain in the nationwide injunction context because, sounding in equity, a party that 
invokes the court’s jurisdiction and asks it to exercise discretion to afford particular 
relief is bound by that court’s discretionary decisions.342 Thus, parties that file 
nationwide injunction suits seeking district courts to exercise their discretion to afford 
broad nationwide relief are legitimately bound by that same court’s discretionary 
decision to not hear the case at all. 
3. Deference to Congress  
Another likely objection to my proposal is that it would be better for Congress to 
act on nationwide injunctions, either passing legislation barring the remedy outright 
or perhaps creating a three-judge panel system like that suggested by Judge Costa.343 
The exact solution is not so important here as is the idea that the judiciary should yield 
to Congress and, in the interim, not try to fix the injunction problem in-house. While 
it might in some ways be sensible for Congress to act, the judiciary’s hands are not 
tied in the interim. 
The beauty of the abstention proposal is that it allows the judiciary to act now but 
does not foreclose Congress from stepping in later. Indeed, it leaves room for Congress 
to ratify or nullify later. This could be justified, as part of a dialogic approach that 
permits the Supreme Court and Congress, working together, to adjust jurisdictional 
lines to take account of changing conceptions of the roles of lower federal courts and 
the Court in our constitutional system. As Barry Friedman explains in another context, 
even if Congress should take the lead, there is no clear bar forbidding Congress from 
“obtaining the assistance of the federal courts in performing this function, or from 
acquiescing in Supreme Court decisions if the Court takes the lead.”344 Of course, the 
Court’s power to speak first on the issue would not necessarily thwart later efforts to 
 
339 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (citing 
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952); Landis v. N. Am. 
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).  
340 Id.  
341 Id. (citing Kerotest Mfg., 342 U.S. at 183; Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 301 U.S. 278 
(1937); Landis, 299 U.S. at 254). 
342 See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 347–50 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
343 Costa, supra note 320. 
344 Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 59 (1990). 
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compel exercise of jurisdiction. If Congress nullified the abstention proposal, courts 
should not willfully refuse Congress’s explicit jurisdictional command.345  
V. CONCLUSION 
Anxieties about nationwide injunctions reached a fever-pitch under the Trump 
administration. But the increased frequency with which the remedy is issued by federal 
courts is not evidence of judicial overreach. In the vast majority of cases, federal 
judges are exercising their conscience within the metes and bounds of Article III’s 
equity, tailoring remedies to protect the parties where law falls short and, in cases 
against the government, checking overreach, just as the Framers intended. Simply put: 
The chancellors are alright. 
As this Article has revealed, the constitutional argument against nationwide 
injunctions—that their illegitimacy is proved by the fact that they were unknown to 
the English Chancellor at the time the Constitution was ratified—totally lacks merit. 
While our equity is in some respects informed by tradition, the Framers did not intend 
for Article III to import the idiosyncratic limits of the English Chancellor. Our equity 
extends as far as necessary to ensure justice to the parties. It evolves to meet modern 
needs. When federal courts, past and present, invoke the English Chancellor, he is a 
symbolic figure that embodies equity’s aspirational aims since time immemorial. The 
ahistoric chancellor embodies equity’s overarching commitments to justice and 
fairness. He also represents a promise by our modern-day chancellors that their 
conscience is guided by a measure of stability and capacity for change that are 
characteristic of equity’s long tradition. The novelty critique of nationwide injunctions 
fails for another reason: the remedy is not even particularly new. Nationwide 
injunctions have been part of federal equity practice for more than a century, bringing 
them well within our tradition, just as Grupo Mexicano commands.346 Moreover, 
although there are isolated problems and abuses sown by nationwide injunctions, these 
issues are not explained by the remedy’s relative novelty and would not be solved by 
eliminating it. 
When the time comes, the Supreme Court should deem the nationwide injunction 
within the metes and bounds of Article III. But it need not and should not stop there. 
The Trump administration was so successful in using the nationwide injunction debate 
to smear the judiciary that it behooves the Court to use its nationwide injunction 
decision to help shore up public confidence in the courts. As I suggest here, this could 
be achieved by adopting a nationwide injunction abstention doctrine. The abstention 
doctrine proposed in this Article serves several purposes. As a practical matter, it gives 
flexible guidance to the lower courts, helping them decide whether it is prudent to 
exercise jurisdiction over nationwide injunction-type suits early on in the process. If 
adopted widely, the abstention approach should inoculate against the most 
troublesome problems nationwide injunctions can sow. An additional benefit is that 
an abstention approach is directly responsive to, but does not overcorrect for, the 
legitimacy problems imprudently granted nationwide injunctions lay bare. 
 
 
345 William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: 
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 327 n.258 (1996). 
346 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 928.   
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